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I. Introduction 
In June of 2003 Officer Billy Collins was called to a domestic 
disturbance in the city of Corpus Christi, Texas.1 The source of the 
disruption, Christopher DeLeon, refused to leave his home, and 
Collins attempted to take him into custody.2 The two men fought, 
and the police officer sprayed DeLeon with mace several times 
before drawing his baton.3 According to DeLeon’s account, the two 
men wrestled over the baton and DeLeon eventually overcame 
Officer Collins, forcing him to the ground.4 DeLeon then backed up 
and stood against the wall with his hands in the air, his 
two-year-old child beside him.5 His wife stepped into the space 
between the officer and her husband.6 Officer Collins then drew his 
weapon and, as an unarmed DeLeon protested from across the 
 
 1. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 2007); 
DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, No. C-05-096, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44191, at 
*2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005).  
 2. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 651. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
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room, shot at DeLeon four times.7 DeLeon fell to the ground, and 
Collins shot at him twice more.8 In total, Officer Collins hit DeLeon 
with four bullets: twice in the chest, once in the side, and once in 
his left arm.9  
Once the violence ceased, DeLeon (who survived the shooting) 
was charged with aggravated assault of a police officer for his role 
in the fight.10 Instead of proceeding to trial, DeLeon entered into a 
deferred adjudication program,11 part of which required him to 
plead guilty to the charge of aggravated assault of a police officer.12 
DeLeon paid a $2,500 fine and was put on probation for ten years.13 
Following successful completion of his probationary period, 
DeLeon would become eligible to have his charges dismissed.14 
Subsequent to his plea, however, and before completing the 
probationary period required by the diversion program, DeLeon 
filed a complaint against Collins under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,15 
asserting false arrest, false imprisonment, use of excessive force, 
and malicious prosecution.16 The United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas dismissed DeLeon’s complaint for 
failure to state a claim,17 finding that his suit was barred under 
the doctrine established by the Supreme Court in Heck v. 
Humphrey.18 The Heck doctrine, which is discussed in detail 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Texas’s deferred adjudication program is one of several pretrial 
programs discussed in this Note, all of which will be referred to as “pretrial 
diversion programs” for the sake of consistency. 
 12. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 13. Id. at 653.  
 14. Id.  
 15. The statute, enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, provides that 
“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).  
 16. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 651.  
 17. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, No. C-05-096, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
44191, at *2, *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005). 
 18. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
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below,19 essentially bars a would-be plaintiff from bringing a civil 
rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if doing so would call into 
question the underlying conviction.20 If DeLeon won his civil rights 
suit, for example, it might imply that his conviction (i.e., his guilty 
plea and probation term) was invalid. The incongruity of a 
conviction followed by a vindication of a civil rights suit is exactly 
what the Heck doctrine purports to protect against.21 The Heck 
doctrine thus necessarily implicates the question of whether a 
defendant’s completion of pretrial diversion programs constitutes 
a conviction. Under Heck, a § 1983 action may only proceed if the 
conviction or sentence underlying the challenge will not be called 
into question.22 This has come to be known as a “favorable 
termination” requirement.23 In DeLeon’s case, because DeLeon 
pleaded guilty and executed a sworn statement that he 
intentionally struck Officer Collins,24 the district court found “that 
 
 19. See infra Part III.C (tracing the development and subsequent 
interpretation of the doctrine).  
 20. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (holding that a potential § 1983 plaintiff “must 
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, 
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . or called into 
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus”); DeLeon, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44191, at *3 (“A plaintiff is barred from bringing a section 1983 
claim if it is a collateral attack on the judgment in his criminal proceeding.”). 
 21. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–85 (“This Court has long expressed similar 
concerns for finality and consistency and has generally declined to expand 
opportunities for collateral attack.”). 
 22. See id. at 487 (“[T]he district court must consider whether a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or 
sentence.”). 
 23. See id. at 492 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court appears to take the 
position that . . . § 1983 requires (and, presumably, has always required) plaintiffs 
seeking damages for unconstitutional conviction or confinement to show the 
favorable termination of the underlying proceeding.”); S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 637 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The requirement that the conviction or 
sentence has been reversed, expunged, or invalidated is analogous to the similar 
requirement in the tort of malicious prosecution and is called the ‘favorable 
termination’ requirement of Heck.”); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 211 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“[W]e hold the ARD program is not a favorable termination under Heck.”). 
 24. See DeLeon, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44191, at *5 (“In addition to entering 
a guilty plea, plaintiff executed a sworn judicial confession stipulating that he 
‘knowingly and intentionally’ struck Officer Collins.”). 
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plaintiff’s plea of guilty and the deferred adjudication shall be 
treated as a conviction.”25 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.26 
DeLeon’s experience, in which he (perhaps unknowingly) 
traded his right to bring a civil rights action for the option of 
entering a deferral program, provides an apt example of the 
difficult, and often severe, consequences that stem from the Heck 
doctrine as it is currently applied by several courts of appeals. 
Pretrial diversion programs such as the deferred adjudication 
program DeLeon entered into are prevalent in state and federal 
courts across the country.27 Indeed, they have been touted as an 
advance in criminal justice reform, allowing those who have 
committed or been accused of relatively minor crimes to avoid the 
costs of a trial.28 Similarly, such programs provide overburdened 
courts with an alternate way to deal with the flood of relatively 
routine cases.29 And pretrial diversion programs promise a host of 
cost savings to the state and federal systems that implement 
them.30 A man like DeLeon, accused of assault, would 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. See DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“We conclude that a deferred adjudication order is a conviction for the purposes 
of Heck’s favorable termination rule.”). 
 27. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
PRETRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAMS RESEARCH SUMMARY 2 (2010) [hereinafter DOJ 
RESEARCH] (cataloguing various types of pretrial diversion programs including 
“statewide diversion programs, prebooking programs, postbooking programs, and 
post-plea programs”); infra notes 51–66 and accompanying text (summarizing 
and evaluating federal and state pretrial diversion programs). 
 28. See, e.g., CHARLES COLSON TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL CORRECTIONS, 
TRANSFORMING PRISONS, RESTORING LIVES ix (2016) [hereinafter TASK FORCE], 
https://perma.cc/GLQ6-VZ55 (PDF) (highlighting the benefits of implementing 
pretrial diversion programs in the federal system, including reducing costs, 
improving public safety, preventing future crimes, and rehabilitation). 
 29. See, e.g., DOJ RESEARCH, supra note 27, at 3 (“Pretrial diversion 
programs have been shown to be time-effective because they keep court dockets 
from becoming too large.”); CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, CRIME & JUSTICE 
INST., PRETRIAL PROGRESS: A SURVEY OF PRETRIAL PRACTICES & SERVICES IN 
CALIFORNIA 4 (2015) (“[C]ounties implementing pretrial practices are becoming 
pioneers in a larger shift toward reducing over-reliance on incarceration and 
instead aligning local resources with best practices—a shift with significant 
public support.”). 
 30. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at xi (listing a potential savings of 
$5 billion dollars if certain recommendations surrounding federal pretrial 
diversion programs were to be implemented). 
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understandably be eager to accept a plea deal and return to his 
work and family, rather than risk time in prison or jail. 
Furthermore, he might well be willing to accept a wide variety of 
plea bargains to avoid the collateral consequences that often stem 
from a criminal conviction.31 Why, then, should DeLeon, and others 
like him, be forced to give up a legitimate civil rights action in order 
to take advantage of these programs? Furthermore, DeLeon and 
others like him cannot even be fully aware of what rights they are 
giving up, if the courts themselves are uncertain. 
As it currently stands, the collateral consequences of accepting 
a deal involving participation in a pretrial diversion program differ 
based on where the accused happens to live. In particular, circuit 
courts disagree on whether participation in a pretrial diversion 
program counts as a favorable termination of the conviction or 
sentence such that a § 1983 action challenging the conviction can 
proceed.32 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Second33 and Third34 Circuits 
consider pretrial diversion programs to be convictions such that a 
subsequent § 1983 action would be barred. However, the Sixth,35 
Tenth,36 and Eleventh37 Circuits have held the opposite.  
 
 31. See National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 
NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., https://perma.cc/43PK-WBFL (last visited Sept. 17, 
2019) (providing a searchable database of collateral consequences) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 32. Compare Gilles, 427 F.3d at 211 (“[T]he ARD program imposes several 
burdens upon the criminal defendant not consistent with innocence, including a 
probationary term . . . . We agree . . . that probation constitutes an ‘unfavorable’ 
period of judicially imposed limitations on freedom.”), and Taylor v. Gregg, 36 
F.3d 453, 455–56 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that pretrial diversion programs are not 
favorable terminations), with Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 
(10th Cir. 2009) (“The diversion agreements resulted in deferral of prosecution of 
the offenses at issue. As a consequence . . . there are no ‘outstanding judgments’ 
or ‘convictions or sentences’ against [the plaintiff].”). 
 33. See Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]e hold [that 
a] trial rehabilitation program is not a termination in favor of the accused for 
purposes of a civil rights suit.”). 
 34. See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e hold the 
[pretrial diversion] program is not a favorable termination under Heck.”). 
 35. See S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(“We hold that Heck is inapplicable, and poses no bar to plaintiffs’ claims.”). 
 36. See Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1095 (“[W]e have determined that the 
Kansas pretrial diversion agreements are not outstanding convictions and 
therefore these § 1983 claims impugning their validity are not barred by Heck.”). 
 37. See McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1252 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[We] 
reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment . . . on the grounds that 
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Following the Introduction, Part II of this Note gives an 
overview of federal and state pretrial diversion programs. Part III 
explores the statutory and doctrinal background of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, including its interaction with another civil rights statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas statute. Both statutes are 
essential to understanding the Heck doctrine’s purpose and 
application to pretrial diversion participants. Part III also explores 
the development and interpretation of the Heck doctrine in four 
Supreme Court cases. Part IV discusses the circuit split as it 
currently stands. Part V presents three proposals for resolving the 
split and analyzes how closely the proposals adhere to the original 
purpose of § 1983 as well as the potential implications of these 
proposals on policy concerns. This Note concludes by suggesting 
that the Court revisit the issue presented by the Heck circuit split 
and clarify that challenges to allegedly unconstitutional 
investigatory practices38 should never be barred by Heck. 
II. An Overview of Pretrial Diversion Programs 
Policy-makers on both sides of the political aisle agree that the 
criminal justice system in the United States as currently 
constituted is significantly flawed.39 States and the federal system 
have instituted various initiatives to address some of these flaws.40 
In the United States, the most common alternatives to 
imprisonment for non-violent criminal offenders are fines, 
probation, and community service.41 In addition to growing trends 
 
Holmberg’s § 1983 claim was Heck-barred.”). 
 38. See id. at 1250 (dividing § 1983 actions into two categories, one 
“involv[ing] suits seeking damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 
imprisonment and the other “for other harm caused by actions whose 
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid”). 
 39. See TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at ix (“There is broad, bipartisan 
agreement that the costs of incarceration have far outweighed the benefits, and 
that our country has largely failed to meet the goals of a well-functioning justice 
system.”). 
 40. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Rethinking Federal Diversion: The Rise 
of Specialized Criminal Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 47, 50 (2017) (identifying 
the rise in front-end specialized court systems in the federal system since 2013).  
 41. See Nora V. Demleitner et al., Sentencing Outcomes: Nonprison 
Punishments, in SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (5th ed. forthcoming) (outlining the 
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in assigning alternative sanctions to non-violent offenders, 
alternative courts have been established in over 1,500 
jurisdictions.42 The most common alternative courts are drug 
courts,43 but jurisdictions have also established therapeutic courts, 
mental health courts, and community courts.44 Some of these 
alternate courts are back-end or reentry programs, meaning that 
offenders enter the programs at the termination of their 
sentence.45 Others are front-end programs, which substitute an 
alternate approach for trial in a traditional court.46 This Note 
focuses on front-end programs, which at least temporarily divert 
offenders from the criminal justice system. Although the details of 
individual diversion program statutes differ by jurisdiction,47 the 
programs by definition share an emphasis on avoiding trial. This 
Part will provide an overview of the growth of pretrial diversion 
programs in the country as well as a brief discussion of the 
language used by the implementing statutes to discuss guilt, 
conviction, and collateral consequences. 
A. Purpose and Prevalence of Pretrial Diversion 
In general, pretrial diversion programs “provid[e] an 
alternative for prosecution for an individual selected for placement 
in a program of supervision.”48 The programs are voluntary and 
 
alternatives to imprisonment commonly implemented based on Bureau of Justice 
statistics). 
 42. See Drug Courts, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://perma.cc/US8G-BF5T (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2019) (giving statistics for alternative courts) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 43. Id. 
 44. See Demleitner, supra note 41, at 58 (“The broader philosophical and 
practical labels used to describe this larger movement are ‘restorative justice’ and 
‘therapeutic courts.’”). 
 45. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 50 (“Most of these courts are drug 
courts, and most operate at the back-end of the system as reentry courts.”).  
 46. See DOJ RESEARCH, supra note 27, at 2 (listing basic differences among 
pretrial, prebooking, postbooking, and post-plea diversion programs).  
 47. See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text (cataloguing various 
elements of the pretrial diversion programs considered in this Note). 
 48. Thomas E. Ulrich, Pretrial Diversion in the Federal Court System, 66 
FED. PROB. 30, 30 (2002). See NAT’L ASSOC. OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, 
PRETRIAL DIVERSION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF PRETRIAL 
DIVERSION PROGRAMS & PRACTICES 6 (2009) [hereinafter NAPSA] (“Pretrial 
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are intended, in part, to decrease recidivism by incentivizing 
defendants to complete the program rather than face prosecution.49 
They are also intended to relieve financial burdens on prison 
systems and accomplish additional policy goals such as 
rehabilitation and channeling of resources into other kinds of 
crime prevention.50 Pretrial diversion programs, both state and 
federal, are becoming more prevalent in jurisdictions across the 
United States.51 The details of diversion programs vary across 
federal districts and states, reflecting the significant role that 
prosecutorial discretion plays in the process.52 Because the 
 
diversion is a voluntary option that provides alternative criminal case 
processing—preferably resulting in dismissal of the charge—for eligible 
defendants.”); CENTER FOR HEALTH AND JUSTICE AT TASC, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES 6 (2013) [hereinafter 
TASC]  
In its most general usage, diversion means that an individual is placed 
on a justice track that is less restrictive and affords more opportunities 
for rehabilitation and restoration. In its most pure form, diversion may 
result in the avoidance or dropping of a charge and dismissal of a case 
completely. At either end of the diversion spectrum, the overriding 
goals are the same—to maximize the opportunity for success and 
minimize the likelihood of recidivism. 
 49. See Ulrich, supra note 48, at 30 (“Under diversion, the possibility that 
prosecution . . . might be suspended is meant to serve as an incentive to 
defendants to change their behavior and habits, particularly because it is clear 
that prosecution will occur if diversion is not completed successfully.”). 
 50. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at xi (highlighting potential benefits 
of a unified approach to pretrial diversion in the federal system as including 
“lower costs, less crime, and a formerly incarcerated population better prepared 
to resume life as good neighbors, good parents, and good taxpayers”). 
 51. See, e.g., AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT’S USE OF PRETRIAL DIVERSION AND 
DIVERSION-BASED COURT PROGRAMS AS ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION, OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (2016), https://perma.cc/6V5B-F2PX (PDF) (“The 
Smart on Crime initiative, announced by the Department of Justice in August 
2013 . . . encouraged federal prosecutors . . . to consider alternatives to 
incarceration such as pretrial diversion and diversion-based court programs 
where appropriate.”); Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 49 (“U-ACT [Utah 
Alternatives to Conviction Track] is the newest of an increasing number of 
‘front-end specialized criminal courts’ operating in the federal system.”). See 
generally Pretrial Diversion, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
https://perma.cc/47JL-3EQA (last visited Sept. 17, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 52. See James A. Shapiro, Comity of Errors: When Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Ignore State Law Decriminalizing Sentences, 41 AKRON L. REV. 231, 
231 (2008) (“Many states have criminal sentences that the United States 
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programs vary by jurisdiction, the procedural details also vary. For 
example, some programs require a defendant to admit guilt before 
entering the program.53 Others require a judicial determination of 
guilt, rather than an admission.54 Still others expressly indicate 
that the defendant is not admitting guilt.55 
Various jurisdictions have designed programs that use the 
jurisdiction’s resources as effectively as possible to “generate the 
greatest return to communities and taxpayers in terms of cost 
savings, public safety, long-term health and personal stability for 
justice-involved populations, and overall community 
improvement.”56 A 2013 survey of diversion programs, focusing on 
programs that did not result in a conviction on the individual’s 
record,57 catalogued 298 programs operating in forty-five states, 
Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Islands.58 The findings 
reflected an increase in the number of programs compared to those 
recorded by a similar survey in 1979, which found 127 pretrial 
diversion programs.59 
 
Sentencing Guidelines . . . refer to as ‘diversionary dispositions.’”); Ulrich, supra 
note 48, at 31 (“In the federal court system, the use of diversion varies across 
districts, reflecting the discretion of the U.S. Attorney’s Offices and district 
characteristics.”). 
 53. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.250(1)(f) (West 2019) (“Any person 
shall be required to enter an Alford plea or a plea of guilty as a condition of 
pretrial diversion.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Huval v. La. State Univ. Police Dep’t, No. 16-00553-BAJ-RLB, 
2018 WL 1095559, at *11, *14 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2018) (finding that because a 
defendant entered a pretrial diversion program “solely at the discretion of the 
District Attorney without any endorsement from a court” the program did not 
count as an admission or judicial determination of guilt). 
 55. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2910 (2019) (“No defendant shall be 
required to enter any plea to a criminal charge as a condition for diversion.”). 
 56. TASC, supra note 48, at 1. 
 57. See id. at 2 (“[T]he distinguishing characteristic for the purposes of this 
survey is that the program not result in a conviction on an individual’s record.”). 
 58. See id. at 17  
A national survey conducted in 1979 noted that there were 127 known 
pretrial diversion programs. By 2010, the number of known programs 
had increased to 298, operating in 45 states, Washington DC, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands. [The National Association of Pretrial Services 
Agencies] counts, at minimum, 80 diversion laws in place in 45 states. 
 59. See id. at 17 (discussing a similar survey conducted in 1979).  
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Because pretrial diversion programs tend to be 
community-based,60 the details and terminology used vary across 
jurisdictions.61 According to the National Association of Pretrial 
Services Agencies (NAPSA): 
Diversion most often includes: alternatives to traditional 
criminal justice proceedings for persons charged with criminal 
offenses; voluntary participation by the accused; access to 
defense counsel prior to a decision to participate; eligibility 
throughout the pretrial period (no sooner than the filing of 
formal charges and prior to a final adjudication of guilt); 
strategies—with input from the accused—to address the needs 
of the accused in avoiding behavior likely to lead to future 
arrests; and dismissal of charges or its equivalent, if the 
divertee successfully completes the diversion process.62  
Regardless of the terminology used, pretrial diversion programs 
“tend to be built around local needs, capacity, and partnerships.”63 
The goals across jurisdictions include reducing overcrowded prison 
populations, reducing costs, and rehabilitative policy initiatives.64 
Finally, pretrial diversion programs are designed for, and 
admit, only a very small subset of the offender population. 
According to the 2013 Treatment Alternatives for Safe 
Communities (TASC) survey, “all respondents use a risk 
assessment or pre-determined eligibility criteria to identify 
appropriate individuals for diversion placement” and most also 
have conditions for remaining in and completing the program.65 Of 
the almost 300 programs surveyed, nearly all focused on 
individuals with behavioral health issues and/or individuals who 
 
 60. See id. at 1 (describing pretrial diversion programs as 
“community-based”). 
 61. See id. at 29 (“The language and vocabulary used in discussions of 
alternatives to arrest, detainment, conviction, sentencing, or post-sentence 
incarceration lacks common definitions and terminologies.”). 
 62. NAPSA, supra note 48, at 7. 
 63. TASC, supra note 48, at 29.  
 64. See id. (“[T]he prevalence of both ‘expediting case disposition’ and 
‘increasing diversion options’ as motivators indicates a broader desire to pursue 
efficient alternatives, individual rehabilitation, and system reform.”). 
 65. NAPSA, supra note 48, at 16–17. 
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had “explicit eligibility criteria that limited program eligibility for 
first-time offenders.”66  
B. Survey of the Specific Programs at Issue in the Circuit Split 
Although the pretrial diversion programs considered by the 
circuit courts vary somewhat, certain key elements remain 
consistent. All of the programs considered require the deferral, but 
not dismissal, of charges pending successful completion of the 
program.67 Many involve both the judge and the prosecutor in a 
determination of whether the defendant is a good candidate for the 
program, considering factors such as the number of prior offenses 
and any history of mental health issues or addiction.68 Of 
particular relevance for courts assessing whether participation in 
the program constitutes a sentence or conviction sufficient to bar a 
future § 1983 action is the question of the defendant’s guilt and 
whether the charges against the defendant remain on the record, 
are dismissed, or are totally expunged. Because the Heck bar is 
explicitly concerned with whether the civil action will implicate an 
underlying conviction, both of these conviction-centric elements 
naturally play a role in the courts’ assessments.  
 Interestingly, although the admission or acceptance of guilt by 
a defendant might seem to be a logical place to draw a line, a guilty 
plea—or lack thereof—is not dispositive to the Heck analysis. 
Circuit courts have come to opposite conclusions regardless of any 
admission of guilt by the participant-plaintiff. For example, the 
Kentucky statute considered in S.E. v. Grant County Board of 
Education69 requires either an Alford plea70 or a plea of guilty as a 
 
 66. TASC, supra note 48, at 28.  
 67. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (describing various pretrial 
diversion programs).  
 68. See, e.g., DOJ RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 27, at 1 (surveying the 
risk assessments and eligibility criteria used to determine needs of and place 
offenders in programs).  
 69. 544 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 70. See Alford Plea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2014) (“A guilty plea that a 
defendant enters as part of a plea bargain without admitting guilt.”); see also 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (holding that an accused may 
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly accept the imposition of a sentence 
even if his guilty plea contains a protestation of innocence). 
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condition for entering the program.71 The Sixth Circuit considering 
that case, however, specified in dicta that Heck would not bar that 
defendant’s § 1983 action.72 As demonstrated by Christopher 
DeLeon’s case, the Texas diversion statute also required a guilty 
plea,73 but the Fifth Circuit explicitly left unanswered the question 
of whether successful completion of the program and a subsequent 
dismissal of charges would still bar DeLeon’s case under Heck.74 
Meanwhile the parallel Kansas statute, which specifies that a 
defendant will not be required to enter a plea of any sort as a 
condition for entering into the program,75 was an important 
rationale for the Tenth Circuit in ruling that Heck does not bar 
that plaintiff’s claim.76 
Equally important, all pretrial diversion statutes considered 
by the circuits mandate that charges be dropped or even 
completely expunged following completion of the program. 
Kentucky’s program specifies that any charges against the 
defendant will be dismissed, and furthermore that participation in 
the program “shall not constitute a criminal conviction.”77 The 
statute further notes that “pretrial diversion records shall not be 
introduced as evidence in any court in a civil, criminal, or other 
matter without the consent of the defendant.”78 Kansas’s statute, 
however, specifies that participation in a diversion program will 
 
 71. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.250(1)(f) (West 2008) (“Any person shall 
be required to enter an Alford plea or a plea of guilty as a condition of pretrial 
diversion.”). 
 72. See Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 639 (“Given the facts of this case, where the 
plaintiff was neither convicted nor sentenced and was habeas-ineligible, we hold 
that Heck is inapplicable, and poses no bar to plaintiff’s claims.”). 
 73. See DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(recognizing that DeLeon had to sign a sworn confession and plead either guilty 
or nolo contendere in order to be eligible for the diversion program).  
 74. See id. (“This case does not require that we decide whether a successfully 
completed deferred adjudication, with its more limited collateral consequences 
under Texas law, is also a conviction for the purposes of Heck.”). 
 75. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2910 (2009) (“No defendant shall be required to 
enter any plea to a criminal charge as a condition for diversion.”). 
 76. See Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting the district court’s determination that the program constituted a 
judgment of criminal guilt). 
 77. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.258(1) (West 2008). 
 78. Id. § 533.258(3). 
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not be admissible in evidence in future criminal proceedings.79 
Kansas also requires that all criminal charges be dismissed with 
prejudice,80 while Florida dismisses charges without prejudice.81 In 
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, charges are dismissed and erased82 
or dismissed and expunged83 following completion of the program.  
As described above, pretrial diversion programs at the state 
level include a variety of different steps and requirements for 
participants to satisfy before being released from the system. 
Despite these differences, each of these programs is intended to 
provide an alternative to the trial court procedures for certain 
individuals who are eligible and selected to participate. However, 
depending on where an alleged offender lives when he or she 
agrees to enter a pretrial diversion program, there may be certain 
collateral consequences attached that may not be immediately 
apparent either to the offender or to his or her attorney. In 
particular, a person who decides to enter a pretrial diversion 
program may lose his or her opportunity to sue for monetary 
damages under the civil rights statute known as Section 1983. The 
next Part will explore the Section 1983 statue and its intersection 
with a similar statute, the federal habeas corpus act, as well as the 
development of the Heck doctrine.  
 
 79. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2910 (2009) (“[T]he following shall not be 
admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings . . . : (1) Participation in a 
diversion program; (2) the facts of such participation; or (3) the diversion 
agreement entered into.”). 
 80. See id. § 22-2909(a) (“A diversion agreement shall provide that if the 
defendant fulfills the obligations of the program . . . [the state] shall act to have 
the criminal charges against the defendant dismissed with prejudice.”). 
 81. See FLA. STAT. § 948.08(5)(c) (2007) (“[D]ismissal of charges without 
prejudice shall be entered in instances in which prosecution is not deemed 
necessary.”). 
 82. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-56e(f) (1992) (“If a defendant . . . satisfactorily 
completes such defendant’s period of probation, such defendant may apply for 
dismissal of the charges . . . . Upon dismissal, all records of such charges shall be 
erased.”). 
 83. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 319, 320 (2005) (“When the defendant shall have 
completed satisfactorily the program prescribed . . . the defendant may move the 
court for an order dismissing the charges.”). 
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III. The Emergence of the Heck Doctrine  
The Heck doctrine developed out of the interaction of two 
Reconstruction Era statutes, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254)84 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1983).85 The former authorizes state 
prisoners to petition federal courts to grant a writ of habeas corpus, 
a means to verify the legality of a person’s imprisonment.86 The 
latter provides a cause of action for individuals to sue for money 
damages if their civil rights are violated.87 Following the passage 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), additional limitations were placed on the habeas 
process.88 The language of these statutes, as well as the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent interpretation,89 creates an intersection of 
sorts for prisoners challenging the legality of their convictions.90  
 
 84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018) (“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a 
circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States.”). 
 85. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018)  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
 86. See Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A writ 
employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the 
person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.”). See generally WILLIAM F. 
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980).  
 87. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (discussing the legislative 
history and purpose of the Civil Rights Act that gave rise to § 1983).  
 88. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See Larry W. Yackle, A 
Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 318, 386–93 (1996) 
(discussing modifications to exhaustion requirements and other limitations 
following passage of the Act). 
 89. See infra Part III.C (discussing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), and 
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)). 
 90. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994)  
This case lies at the intersection of the two most fertile sources of 
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A. Enactment and Purpose of Section 1983 
Section 1983 creates a cause of action for any person deprived 
of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws” by a person acting “under the color of” state 
law.91 Generally, the statute is intended to protect individuals 
against an inappropriate use of state power.92 The Supreme Court 
has several times delved into the legislative history behind the 
statute’s enactment in order to determine its legislative purpose. 
In Monroe v. Pape,93 the Court explained that “[i]t was not the 
unavailability of state remedies but the failure of certain States to 
enforce the laws with an equal hand that furnished the powerful 
momentum behind this force bill.”94 Claims brought under § 1983 
that are based on a state actor allegedly violating an individual’s 
civil rights—i.e. a state failing to enforce a constitutional 
right— are therefore a perfect example of how the statute functions 
as intended.  
The Supreme Court has also interpreted the intended reach of 
the statute. The Court suggested a broad reading of the statute in 
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.95 by highlighting the 
historical context of the enactment.96 The Court explained that 
 
federal-court prisoner litigation—the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . . and 
the federal habeas corpus statute. Both of these provide access to a 
federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of 
state officials. 
See also Lyndon Bradshaw, Comment, The Heck Conundrum: Why Federal 
Courts Should Not Overextend the Heck v. Humphrey Preclusion Doctrine, 2014 
BYU L. REV. 185, 207 (2014) (identifying the functioning of the doctrines as 
overlapping circles, or, alternately, as the intersection between “§ 1983 Street” 
and “Habeas Street”).  
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
 92. See Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624, 628 n.8 (9th Cir. 1973)  
As the debates at the time disclose, Congress sought to effectuate three 
purposes in enacting § 1983: (1) to override certain kinds of state laws; 
(2) to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate; and (3) to 
afford a federal remedy where the state remedy, while adequate in 
theory, was not available in practice. 
See generally 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 64 (2018). 
 93. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 94. Id. at 174–75. 
 95. 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
 96. See id. at 258 (“It is by now well settled that the tort liability created 
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“members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law 
principles, including defenses previously recognized in ordinary 
tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law 
principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.”97 
The Court then reiterated this broad reading of the statute’s 
application in Briscoe v. LaHue,98 acknowledging that “it has been 
settled that the all-encompassing language of § 1983 . . . is not to 
be taken literally.”99 Then, in Kalina v. Fletcher,100 the Court 
compared the § 1983 cause of action to prior common law 
principles: “The coverage of the statute is thus broader than the 
pre-existing common law of torts. We have nevertheless recognized 
that Congress intended the statute to be construed in the light of 
common-law principles that were well settled at the time of its 
enactment.”101  
Two broad themes thus emerge from the Court’s 
interpretation of § 1983. The first is that Congress intended the 
statute to be read broadly, to protect individuals when the state 
has acted improperly or failed to act to protect constitutional 
rights.102 The second theme is that while common law provides a 
basis for interpreting § 1983, common law is not coequal with the 
statute. Both of these themes come up in the Court’s jurisprudence 
in the line of cases that includes Heck.103 
 
by § 1983 cannot be understood in a historical vacuum.”). 
 97. Id.  
 98. 460 U.S. 325 (1983). 
 99. Id. at 330. 
 100. 522 U.S. 118 (1997). 
 101. Id. at 123. 
 102. Of course, even if the statute is theoretically available to a large swath 
of individuals, few plaintiffs ever get past the doctrine of qualified immunity. See, 
e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified 
immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as 
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (citation omitted)). 
 103. See infra notes 134–193 and accompanying text (tracing these two 
themes).  
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B. Enactment and Purpose of Federal Habeas Corpus 
The other statute that repeatedly appears in the Heck 
jurisprudence is the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.104 
The intersection of Section 1983 with the habeas statute, and 
particularly the way the two statutes function as resources for 
individuals challenging the state, illuminates the debate around 
the Heck doctrine in the lower courts. Of particular relevance, the 
federal habeas statute requires that a state prisoner exhaust all 
state remedies before bringing a claim under the statute,105 one of 
the major justifications given by the Court when developing the 
Heck doctrine.106 
The Supreme Court took up the question of the availability of 
the federal habeas statute to state prisoners in several cases in the 
1960s and 1970s. In Fay v. Noia,107 Justice Brennan surveyed the 
history of the writ of habeas corpus as part of an inquiry into the 
boundaries of the federal and state systems of criminal justice.108 
He noted that “[i]ts root principle is that in a civilized society, 
government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a 
man’s imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to 
conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual 
is entitled to his immediate release.”109 Arguing for a broad 
interpretation of federal court jurisdiction in habeas petitions, 
Justice Brennan summarized the history of the statute by 
declaring that “Congress in 1867 sought to provide a federal forum 
for state prisoners having constitutional defenses by extending the 
habeas corpus powers of the federal courts to their constitutional 
 
 104. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018). See infra Part III.C.1–4 (discussing the 
development of the Heck doctrine in part to monitor the intersection of the habeas 
statute with § 1983).  
 105. See § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ . . . shall not be granted 
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the 
courts of the State.”). 
 106. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the justifications for the development 
of the Heck bar, including that prisoners not be allowed to evade the exhaustion 
requirements of the habeas statute by instituting a § 1983 suit instead). 
 107. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
 108. See id. at 399–426 (tracing the development of the writ of habeas corpus 
from its origins in seventeenth-century English jurisprudence through the 
then-present). 
 109. Id. at 402. 
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maximum.”110 Under this approach, a court might be more inclined 
than not to err on the side of allowing state prisoners to collaterally 
attack a conviction if there were any reasonable claim of 
unconstitutionality. 
Notably, however, Justice Brennan’s equitable view of the 
habeas statute did not go unquestioned, even decades before 
AEDPA legislation passed. Justice Clark’s dissent in Fay pointed 
out the significant effect this view of habeas has on both judicial 
efficiency111 and the administration of justice.112 A decade later, in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,113 Justice Powell took up the 
question.114 Justice Powell characterized Justice Brennan’s view in 
Fay as “a revisionist view of the historic function that writ was 
meant to perform,”115 arguing instead that “recent scholarship has 
cast grave doubt on Fay’s version of the writ’s historic function.”116 
As a result, Justice Powell pointed out that the writ of habeas 
corpus was then afforded an unreasonably “wide scope,” having 
little to do with its “historic, common-law development.”117 While 
 
 110. Id. at 426. The case concerned a prisoner, Charles Noia, who was 
convicted of felony murder along with two codefendants. Id. at 394. All three were 
convicted on the basis of confessions later found to have been coerced. Id. at 395. 
Noia’s two codefendants were released, but Noia failed to timely appeal and was 
then barred from filing a federal habeas petition for failure to exhaust state 
remedies. Id. at 398. Justice Brennan pointed out that while federal habeas 
jurisdiction must be limited, the intent of the habeas statute requires equitable 
treatment of “persons whom society has grievously wronged.” Id. at 441. 
Furthermore, “[i]f the States withhold effective remedy, the federal courts have 
the power and the duty to provide it.” Id. 
 111. See id. at 446 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“[T]here can be no question but that 
a rash of new applications from state prisoners will pour into the federal courts, 
and 98% of them will be frivolous, if history is any guide.”). 
 112. See id. (“After today state judgments will be relegated to a judicial limbo, 
subject to federal collateral attack—as here—a score of years later despite a 
defendant’s willful failure to appeal.”). 
 113. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 114. See id. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring) (“While I join the opinion of the 
Court, it does not address what seems to me the overriding issue briefed and 
argued in this case: the extent to which federal habeas corpus should be available 
to a state prisoner seeking to exclude evidence from an allegedly unlawful search 
and seizure.”). 
 115. Id. at 252. 
 116. Id. at 253.  
 117. Id. 
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Justice Powell agreed that the writ functions as an important 
guardian of liberty for individuals,118 the broad reading established 
in Fay was, in his view, an “unprecedented extension . . . far 
beyond its historic bounds and in disregard of the writ’s central 
purpose.”119 Justice Powell also addressed whether a petitioner’s 
guilt or innocence should be a factor in whether a court may hear 
the petition,120 arguing that because guilt is rarely at issue in 
Fourth Amendment claims, federal habeas should not be 
available.121 The costs of such broad interpretation, Justice Powell 
argued, are far too high, given that the cases coming before the 
courts are no longer about guilt or innocence, but rather about 
procedural defaults in earlier postures.122 Here, one begins to see 
the contraction of the Court’s interpretation of collateral attacks 
and the glimmerings of the guilt-or-innocence question that the 
Court will take up in the Heck line of cases.123  
 
 118. See id. at 256 (“Habeas corpus indeed should provide the added 
assurance for a free society that no innocent man suffers an unconstitutional loss 
of liberty.”).  
 119. Id. at 259.  
 120. See id. at 258 (“I am aware that history reveals no exact tie of the writ of 
habeas corpus to a constitutional claim relating to innocence or guilt. 
Traditionally, the writ was unavailable even for many constitutional pleas 
grounded on a claimant’s innocence . . . .”). 
 121. See id. (“Prisoners raising Fourth Amendment claims collaterally 
usually are quite justly detained. . . . Rarely is there any contention that the 
search rendered the evidence unreliable or that its means cast doubt upon the 
prisoner’s guilt.”). 
 122. See id. at 274  
If these consequences flowed from the safeguarding of constitutional 
claims of innocence they should, of course, be accepted as a tolerable 
price to pay for cherished standards of justice at the same time that 
efforts are pursued to find more rational procedures. Yet, as illustrated 
by the case before us today, the question on habeas corpus is too rarely 
whether the prisoner was innocent of the crime for which he was 
convicted and too frequently whether some evidence of undoubted 
probative value has been admitted in violation of an exclusionary rule 
ritualistically applied.  
 123. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the Court’s opinion in Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)). Preiser, handed down just three weeks prior to 
Schneckloth, held that a state prisoner challenging the duration of his 
confinement may only bring an action under the federal habeas statute and not 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and 
Marshall dissented in both cases. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Regrettably, 
the Court today . . . [draws] a distinction that is both analytically unsound and I 
fear, unworkable in practice.”); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRETRIAL DIVERSION 1783 
 
The Court’s interpretation of the reach of the habeas statute 
continued to contract following Schneckloth. In later 
jurisprudence, the Court continued to emphasize the importance 
of preventing constant re-litigation of well-settled claims in the 
context of collateral attacks under the habeas statute. In 1990, in 
affirming a denial of a federal habeas petition in the Eighth 
Amendment context, the Court reaffirmed that “the purpose of 
federal habeas corpus is to ensure that state convictions comply 
with the federal law in existence at the time the conviction became 
final, and not to provide a mechanism for the continuing 
reexamination of final judgments based upon later emerging legal 
doctrine.”124 Following the enactment of AEDPA in 1996, the Court 
again pointed out that finality of judgment played a role in the 
legislative and judicial considerations driving the criminal justice 
system. In Rhines v. Weber,125 for example, the Court explained 
that “AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period ‘quite plainly serves the 
well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgments.’ It 
‘reduces the potential for delay on the road to finality by restricting 
the time that a prospective federal habeas petitioner has in which 
to seek federal habeas review.’”126 Two years earlier, the Court had 
reasoned that Congress intended “to further the principles of 
comity, finality, and federalism” by enacting AEDPA.127 Thus, 
while the Court generally interprets § 1983 broadly, the Court’s 
interpretation of the habeas statute has contracted over time, 
especially following the passage of AEDPA. Nonetheless, the two 
statutes continue to overlap, as seen in the development of the 
Court’s Heck jurisprudence.  
 
dissenting) (“It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to 
have waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever 
being aware of its existence. . . . I respectfully dissent.”).  
 124. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990). 
 125. 54 U.S. 269 (2005). 
 126. Id. at 276 (citing Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). 
 127. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)). 
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C. Tracing the Supreme Court’s Heck Jurisprudence 
The Heck doctrine springs in part from the two statutes just 
discussed. In his majority opinion in Heck, Justice Scalia discussed 
the intersection of the § 1983 statute and the federal habeas 
statute.128 Justice Scalia at first seemed to be following the Court’s 
precedent in Preiser v. Rodriguez,129 which explicates where 
habeas leaves off and § 1983 begins.130 However, Justice Scalia 
eventually dismissed that line of reasoning and instead turned to 
tort law, comparing a § 1983 claim to an action for malicious 
prosecution.131 In Justice Scalia’s view, the malicious prosecution 
line of reasoning was a closer analogy to the § 1983 statute.132 In 
some ways, the Justice’s reasoning did pick up on some of the 
common law underpinnings of the § 1983 statute.133 However, 
lower courts have recognized two alternate rationales from the 
Heck majority, and confusion over how to interpret Heck runs 
rampant.134 The reasoning used by the circuit courts in the pretrial 
 
 128. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (rejecting the idea that 
Roy Heck’s case could be solved under the rubric established in Preiser to 
differentiate between the two statutes).  
 129. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 
 130. See infra notes 138–146 and accompanying text (analyzing Preiser).  
 131. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484 (“The common-law cause of action for malicious 
prosecution provides the closest analogy to claims of the type considered here.”). 
 132. See id. (“[P]etitioner seeks not immediate or speedier release, but 
monetary damages, as to which he could not ‘have sought and obtained fully 
effective relief through federal habeas corpus proceedings.’” (quoting Preiser, 411 
U.S. at 494)). 
 133. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text (identifying the common 
law elements from which § 1983 developed).  
 134. See, e.g., DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 654 (5th Cir. 
2007) (“Heck’s favorable termination doctrine is supported by two 
somewhat-independent rationales, which divide the Court and circuits even 
today.” (citations omitted)); Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 187 (identifying a circuit 
split over whether the Heck doctrine applies to bar a co-felon’s civil rights suit); 
Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable 
Termination Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 868, 868 (2008) [hereinafter Defining the Reach] (identifying lower 
court confusion on the question of whether state prisoners ineligible for habeas 
relief have access to § 1983); Eric J. Savoy, Comment, Heck v. Humphrey: What 
Should State Prisoners Use When Seeking Damages from State Officials, Section 
1983 or Federal Habeas Corpus?, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
109, 138 (1996) (“[T]he anticipated Supreme Court case [Heck] has made a 
complex area of the law even more complicated.”). 
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diversion context is a direct consequence of the two rationales of 
Heck as interpreted in conjunction with the entire line of cases that 
discuss when and how a plaintiff is eligible to bring a § 1983 claim. 
1. An Initial Approach: Habeas Is the Proper Remedy to Obtain 
Release 
In Preiser v. Rodriguez,135 state prisoners brought a § 1983 
action against the New York State Department of Correctional 
Services alleging unconstitutional deprivation of “good-time” 
credits during their confinement.136 Restoring the credits would 
result in each prisoner’s release from prison.137 At issue in the case 
was whether the prisoners could sue under § 1983, rather than 
petitioning under the habeas statute.138 As the Court noted, the 
issue was one “of considerable practical importance. For if a 
remedy under the Civil Rights Act is available, a plaintiff need not 
first seek redress in a state forum.”139 In other words, the 
opportunity to choose a civil rights action under § 1983 instead of 
bringing a habeas petition would allow a plaintiff to avoid the 
exhaustion requirements of the habeas statute, thus frustrating 
the intent of Congress.140 To assess the reasonableness of the 
claim, the Court examined both statutes, identifying that “the 
problem involves the interrelationship of two important federal 
laws.”141 In addition to probing congressional intent,142 the Court 
discussed the history of habeas proceedings as a means to secure 
 
 135. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 
 136. Id. at 476. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 477 (“The question before us is whether state prisoners seeking 
such redress may obtain equitable relief under the Civil Rights Act, even though 
the federal habeas corpus statute . . . clearly provides a specific federal remedy.”). 
 139. Id.  
 140. See id. at 489 (“In amending the habeas corpus laws in 1948, Congress 
clearly required exhaustion of adequate state remedies as a condition precedent 
to the invocation of federal judicial relief under those laws.”). 
 141. Id. at 483.  
 142. See id. at 489 (suggesting that the broad language of § 1983 does not 
necessarily mean Congress intended it to be literally applicable to all possible 
plaintiffs). 
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release from unlawful physical confinement.143 Ultimately the 
Court held that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact 
or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is 
a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a 
speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy 
is a writ of habeas corpus.”144 The Preiser case thus laid the 
groundwork for later discussions of the intersection of § 1983 with 
the habeas statute. Indeed, that question was one the Court 
explicitly took up in its next foray into the issue in Heck.  
2. The Heck Doctrine Takes Shape 
The issue before the Court in Heck v. Humphrey was “whether 
a state prisoner may challenge the constitutionality of his 
conviction in a suit for damages under [§ 1983].”145 The petitioner, 
Roy Heck, was serving a fifteen year sentence for voluntary 
manslaughter of his wife. Heck alleged that prosecutors in his case 
had violated his constitutional rights by engaging in various 
unlawful investigation practices.146 Importantly, Heck’s complaint 
sought only money damages, not injunctive relief or release from 
custody.147 Under Preiser, therefore, his case did not fall within the 
boundaries of the federal habeas statute. 
Justice Scalia’s majority decision immediately pointed to the 
preceding decision in Preiser, revisiting its assertion that “habeas 
corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges 
the fact or duration of his confinement . . . even though such a claim 
may come within the literal terms of § 1983.”148 He then noted that 
the issue for Heck was not about confinement at all but rather 
monetary damages, therefore bringing the case outside of Preiser’s 
 
 143. See id. at 485 (“[O]ver the years, the writ of habeas corpus evolved as a 
remedy available to effect discharge from any confinement contrary to the 
Constitution or fundamental law.”). 
 144. Id. at 500.  
 145. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994). 
 146. See id. at 479 (alleging arbitrary investigation procedures, destruction of 
evidence, and use of an unlawful “voice identification procedure”). 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 481.  
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holding.149 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia noted that two dicta points 
in Preiser needed clarification. The first, suggesting that “a 
damages action by a state prisoner could be brought under § 1983 
in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of 
state remedies,” failed to take into account actions that would 
challenge the validity of the claimant’s underlying conviction.150 
Once a claim challenged an underlying conviction, the second 
dictum came into play, namely that state prisoners “attacking the 
validity of the fact or length of their confinement” must use the 
habeas statute.151 From there, however, Justice Scalia moved away 
from the consideration of the two statutes, instead turning to 
consider a completely different rationale for answering the 
question before the Court. Since the Court had previously 
compared § 1983 to tort liability, Justice Scalia reasoned that the 
common law would provide better guidance.152 The “closest 
analogy,” he found, was the tort of malicious prosecution, which 
“permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal 
process.”153 From there, the majority opinion reviewed the history 
of malicious prosecution and identified a key element in a cause of 
action for malicious prosecution: proof that the underlying 
criminal proceeding terminated in the would-be plaintiff’s favor.154 
Following this analogy and rationale, the Supreme Court held that 
“a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has 
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged . . . declared 
invalid . . . or called into question by a . . . writ of habeas corpus” 
in order to bring a suit for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 
imprisonment.155  
As far as the Heck majority opinion goes, the holding was quite 
clear. However, Justice Souter’s concurrence complicated the issue 
 
 149. See id. (“This case is clearly not covered by the holding of Preiser.”). 
 150. Id. at 481–82.  
 151. Id. at 482.  
 152. See id. at 483 (“Thus, to determine whether there is any bar to the 
present suit, we look first to the common law of torts.”). 
 153. Id. at 484.  
 154. See id. (“This requirement avoids parallel litigation . . . and precludes the 
possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after having been 
convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution.”). 
 155. Id. at 486–87. 
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by more closely examining the ways in which the habeas statute 
and § 1983 interact.156 Justice Souter picked up on the second 
rationale of the majority opinion and offered it as a clearer 
standard.157 He pointed out the oddities in using a common law 
analogy to resolve a statutory question when there were other 
possible means to resolve the issue.158 He also disagreed with the 
decision to rely entirely on common law analogies, noting that 
“ordinary rules of statutory interpretation” should not be so 
completely set aside.159 While the common law provided a useful 
aid in the inquiry, Justice Souter found that the methodology of 
Preiser would be more effective.160 Therefore, the Justice suggested 
an alternative: “A state prisoner may seek federal-court § 1983 
damages for unconstitutional conviction or confinement, but only 
if he has previously established the unlawfulness of his conviction 
or confinement, as on appeal or on habeas.”161 Indeed, Justice 
Souter pointed out that the majority opinion could be read to say 
exactly that much and no more.162 His fear was that, under an 
alternate reading, the holding “would needlessly place at risk the 
rights of those outside the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas 
statute, individuals not ‘in custody’ for habeas purposes.”163 
Indeed, as Justice Souter feared, lower courts immediately 
struggled to reconcile the majority’s holding with the realities of 
 
 156. See id. at 491–92 (Souter, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority’s 
decision to begin by noting the interaction of the two statutes, but also criticizing 
the majority for not following the path further). 
 157. See id. at 498 (“A state prisoner may seek federal-court § 1983 damages 
for unconstitutional conviction or confinement, but only if he has previously 
established the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, as on appeal or on 
habeas.”). 
 158. See id. at 492–96 (pointing out that the Court traditionally relies on 
common law only when other statutory interpretation principles fail; that the 
majority ignores other aspects of malicious prosecution; and that any definition 
of “favorable termination” at the time of the statute’s enactment would have been 
vastly different than modern-day interpretations). 
 159. Id. at 492.  
 160. See id. at 497 (“Though in contrast to Preiser the state prisoner here 
seeks damages, not release from custody, the distinction makes no difference 
when the damages sought are for unconstitutional conviction or confinement.”). 
 161. Id. at 498.  
 162. Id. at 500.  
 163. Id.  
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRETRIAL DIVERSION 1789 
 
cases arriving in the lower courts, and the Court was asked to 
revisit the issue just four years later in Spencer v. Kenma.164 
3. A Split Court Revisits Heck  
The Court nuanced the discussion of the intersection between 
habeas and § 1983 in its 1998 decision in Spencer. There, petitioner 
Randy Spencer had filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to 
invalidate an order revoking his parole.165 The petition alleged a 
violation of due process.166 Although six months remained on his 
sentence when the claim was initially brought,167 Spencer was no 
longer imprisoned by the time the district court got around to his 
case.168 The issue before the Supreme Court was “whether 
petitioner’s subsequent release caused the petition to be moot 
because it no longer presented a case or controversy under Article 
III, § 2, of the Constitution.”169 Spencer’s argument (as 
characterized by Justice Scalia) was that because Heck would bar 
his § 1983 claim unless he could demonstrate that the underlying 
conviction (here, his parole revocation) was invalid, the action to 
invalidate his parole revocation could not be moot.170 In other 
words, the fact that Spencer wanted to sue for damages under 
§ 1983 should be enough to imbue his habeas suit with controversy 
and thereby give him standing. Justice Scalia, unimpressed, called 
Spencer’s Heck argument “a great non sequitur.”171  
Justice Souter, however, wrote a concurring opinion in which 
he joined the Court’s opinion but elaborated on the intersection of 
 
 164. 523 U.S. 1 (1998). 
 165. See id. at 3–4 (describing Spencer’s alleged violations of his parole 
conditions and his subsequent efforts to invalidate the order of revocation). 
 166. Id. at 5.  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 6. As the Court notes, Spencer had returned to prison by the time 
his case reached the Supreme Court. See id. at 6 n.2 (“By the time the [instant] 
case reached the Eighth Circuit, petitioner was once again in prison, this time 
serving a 7-year sentence for attempted felony stealing. He is still there . . . .”). 
 169. Id. at 7.  
 170. Id. at 17. 
 171. Id.  
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§ 1983 and the federal habeas statute.172 In fact, much of the 
opinion revisited ground already laid out in the Heck concurrence, 
with Justice Souter explaining that his rationale in Heck was 
equally applicable to Spencer’s case.173 Justice Souter concluded 
that “[t]he better view, then, is that a former prisoner, no longer 
‘in custody,’ may bring a § 1983 action establishing the 
unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being 
bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it would 
be impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy.”174 In Justice 
Souter’s reasoning, therefore, whenever the federal habeas statute 
is not available to those not in custody, § 1983 should be, in order 
to satisfy both congressional intent and policy considerations.175  
Unfortunately for the lower courts, Spencer did little to clarify 
the boundaries of the Heck doctrine. While Spencer’s majority 
opinion was joined by eight of the nine Justices,176 the majority did 
not directly address the question of whether the Heck doctrine 
barred Spencer’s suit.177 At the same time, Justice Souter’s 
concurrence was joined by three other Justices,178 and Justice 
Stevens agreed with its rationale in his dissent.179 Therefore five 
Justices had arguably endorsed an alternate rationale for 
resolving the Heck bar, one in which the availability of a recourse 
 
 172. Id. at 18 (Souter, J., concurring).  
 173. See id. at 19–21 (reitrating his Heck rationale and applying his preferred 
holding to the new context).  
 174. Id. at 21.  
 175. See id. at 20 (“I also thought we were bound to recognize the apparent 
scope of § 1983 when no limitation was required for the sake of honoring some 
other statute or weighty policy.”). Justice Souter’s opinion picked up on at least 
one additional policy issue left unmentioned by the court: that an individual 
arguably should not lose access to a civil rights action for unconstitutional 
treatment by the state simply because that individual served his or her sentence. 
Such an individual might have an ever greater interest in pursuing justice if he 
or she had already undergone an allegedly unjust punishment.  
 176. See id. at 2 (listing all but Justice Stevens joining the majority). 
 177. See id. at 17 (foreclosing Spencer’s Heck argument as “a great non 
sequitur”). 
 178. See id. at 18 (listing Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer as joining 
Justice Souter’s concurrence).  
 179. See id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Given the Court’s holding that 
petitioner does not have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, 
as Justice Souter explains, that he may bring an action under § 1983.”). 
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under habeas was the primary determination of whether an 
individual could bring suit under § 1983.  
4. Future Convictions Exempted from Heck  
The Court’s most recent addition to Heck jurisprudence came 
in 2007 in Wallace v. Kato.180 Petitioner Andre Wallace filed a 
§ 1983 action against arresting officers for a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.181 Wallace was arrested in 1994 in an investigation 
for the murder of a Chicago man, John Handy.182 Wallace, then 
fifteen years old, admitted to the murder during a police 
interrogation and signed a written confession.183 He was convicted 
and sentenced to twenty-six years in prison.184 The appellate court 
remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that his statements 
after his arrest were not admissible,185 and eight years after the 
arrest, prosecutors dropped the charges.186 The issue before the 
Court was whether Wallace’s § 1983 suit was timely, since under 
Illinois law Wallace only had two years to file his § 1983 suit.187 
The Court therefore had to determine whether the two year clock 
began at the time of Wallace’s arrest, or whether it began on the 
date on which the petitioner’s conviction was vacated. Although 
the case was resolved on other grounds,188 the Heck-specific issue 
in Wallace was whether the petitioner’s § 1983 action, which had 
been barred under Heck while he was incarcerated, would be 
 
 180. 549 U.S. 384 (2007).  
 181. See id. at 386 n.1 (describing the suit as seeking damages arising from 
his unlawful arrest, as well as some additional claims not before the court). 
 182. Id. at 386. 
 183. See id. (“After interrogations that lasted into the early morning hours 
the next day, petitioner agreed to confess to Handy’s murder.”). 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 387. 
 186. See id. at 386–87 (“On January 17, 1994, John Handy was shot to 
death . . . [T]wo days later, Chicago police officers located petitioner . . . . On April 
10, 2002, prosecutors dropped the charges against petitioner.”). 
 187. See id. at 387 (explaining that the statute of limitations for filing a 
federal § 1983 claim is based on the length of time the state provides for filing a 
personal injury tort—two years, in Illinois). 
 188. See id. at 391 (relying on state tolling law and common law to resolve 
Wallace’s case). 
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outside the statute of limitations once that conviction was later 
vacated.189 In another opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court 
suggested that “[a]spects of § 1983 which are not governed by 
reference to state law are governed by federal rules conforming in 
general to common-law tort principles.”190 The Court then held 
that “the statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking 
damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run 
at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal 
process.”191 In other words, Wallace was out of luck. However, 
Justice Scalia also wrote that an expansion of the Heck bar to 
“impugn an anticipated future conviction” would be pushing the 
doctrine too far.192 “The impracticality of such a rule should be 
obvious.”193 Under Justice Scalia’s view, the Heck bar could not be 
extended to cover anticipated convictions, only reasonably 
contemplated ones. In the context of pretrial diversion, such an 
approach might be particularly relevant, because in the majority 
of pretrial diversion programs there is no conviction.194 Conviction 
is a possibility, but not necessarily a likelihood.  
Although the bulk of the Heck doctrine is contained in Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinions in Heck and Spencer and in Justice 
Souter’s concurrences in both cases, important elements stem from 
Preiser and Wallace as well. Preiser outlined the primary policy 
rationale underlying the Heck doctrine: that plaintiffs should not 
be able to use § 1983 to avoid the exhaustion requirements of the 
habeas statute.195 Wallace added the question of anticipated future 
convictions to the conversation.196 Both themes, as well as the two 
competing rationales of Heck and Spencer, reappear in the cases 
decided in the circuit split, which will be discussed in the next Part. 
 
 189. See id. at 394 (“[I]t raises the question whether, assuming that the Heck 
bar takes effect when the later conviction is obtained, the statute of limitations 
on the once valid cause of action is tolled as long as the Heck bar subsists.”). 
 190. Id. at 388. 
 191. Id. at 397.  
 192. Id. at 393. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (describing the guilt and 
conviction aspects of certain pretrial diversion programs).  
 195. Supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text. 
 196. Supra notes 192–193 and accompanying text.  
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IV. Ongoing Circuit Split on Pretrial Diversion Programs 
Under Heck 
Following the Supreme Court’s establishment of the Heck bar 
in 1994, lower courts have struggled to identify what constitutes a 
prior conviction for the purposes of the doctrine.197 Many note the 
competing rationales espoused within Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion, which discussed the precedent established in Preiser, the 
tort of malicious prosecution, and the exhaustion of state 
remedies.198 This Part will discuss the circuit split that currently 
exists as to whether participation in a pretrial diversion program 
bars an individual from bringing a later civil rights action under 
§ 1983 for an incident stemming from the same act.  
 
 197. Recently, a Maryland federal district court followed the reasoning of the 
Fifth Circuit in DeLeon in holding that participation in Maryland’s pretrial 
probation program barred a § 1983 claim. See Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F. Supp. 
3d 366, 379 (D. Md. 2018) (“Although a PBJ [probation before judgment] 
disposition . . . does not result in a formal conviction or judgment . . . it is, like a 
Texas deferred adjudication, a final judicial act. . . . More importantly, a PBJ, by 
statute, necessarily comes after a finding of guilt.”). But the question of whether 
prior proceedings should count as a “conviction” also implicates no contest pleas, 
disciplinary convictions, and lesser-included offenses. See, e.g., Taylor v. Cty. of 
Pima, 913 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that plaintiff could not recover 
damages under § 1983 for wrongful incarceration when his original arson 
convictions were vacated and he pled no contest to the same charges, was 
sentenced to time served, and was immediately released from prison); Bourne v. 
Gunnes, 921 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2019) (reversing the district court’s 
determination that a prisoner’s excessive force claims would “implicate the 
validity of his disciplinary conviction for creating the disturbance that resulted in 
the use of force”); Dennis v. City of Phila., 379 F. Supp. 3d 420, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2019) 
(concluding that Heck did not bar a § 1983 suit by a prisoner who had first 
obtained federal habeas relief and then pled no contest to a lesser-included 
offense); Maloley v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 931 N.W.2d 139, 
146 (Neb. 2019) (rejecting the argument that Heck should not bar constitutional 
due process claims that preceded trespass convictions).  
 198. See, e.g., DeLeon v. Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 654 n.22 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(comparing the majority opinions in Heck and Spencer to the concurrence of 
Justice Souter in Heck and the opinions of Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens 
in Spencer to support the proposition that both the Court and the circuits are 
divided). See also supra notes 148–155 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Heck opinion). 
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A. In Three Circuits, Pretrial Diversion Does Not Trigger 
the Heck Bar 
In the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, participation in a 
pretrial diversion program does not constitute a conviction for 
purposes of the Heck doctrine, regardless of the specifics of the 
program. The clearest assessment of why pretrial diversion should 
not be considered a conviction for purposes of the Heck doctrine 
comes out of the Eleventh Circuit. 
1. No Conviction, No Heck Bar 
The Eleventh Circuit suggested several reasons a pretrial 
diversion program should not trigger the Heck bar in McClish v. 
Nugent.199 Following various altercations with the police in 2001, 
Edmund Holmberg was arrested for resisting a police officer.200 He 
was admitted to and completed a pretrial intervention program, 
after which the charge against him was dismissed.201 Holmberg 
then brought a § 1983 suit against the arresting officers in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida 
alleging unlawful arrest, harassment, and knowingly using false 
testimony in preparing an affidavit.202 The district court granted 
summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that Holmberg’s 
wrongful arrest claim was barred by Heck because of his prior 
participation in the pretrial diversion program.203 
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of the issue by 
exploring the rationale behind Heck, noting that the Heck bar was 
designed “to avoid the problem inherent in two potentially 
conflicting resolutions arising out of the same set of events by 
 
 199. 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 200. See id. at 1236 (describing the arrest of Holmberg after police officers 
arrived at his home and arrested his co-defendant Douglas McClish).  
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  
 203. See McClish v. Nugent, No. 8:04-CV-2723-T-24TGW, 2006 WL 8440092, 
at *1, *10 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2006) (“[T]he Court concludes that Holmberg’s 
participation in PTI, which resulted in a dismissal of the charge of resisting arrest 
without violence, is not a termination in his favor, and therefore, he is barred 
from bringing a § 1983 claim for false arrest.”); McClish, 483 F.3d at 1233 (citing 
the same language from the district court).  
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foreclosing collateral attacks on convictions through the vehicle of 
a § 1983 suit.”204 The court then wrestled with the Heck and 
Spencer dichotomy, finding that Spencer suggested that § 1983 
claims are only barred when habeas is available.205 The court 
articulated two kinds of potential challenges that would give rise 
to Heck issues: challenges to the judgment (the conviction itself)206 
and challenges to procedures (tbe steps leading to the arrest or 
conviction).207 This division between types of challenges might be 
better characterized as a split between challenges to adjudicative 
procedures and challenges to investigatory procedures. Based on 
this articulation, the court reasoned that because the defendant 
was never convicted, he therefore could not fall within either 
category of Heck conflicts.208 As a result, the facts of his case would 
not even implicate the question of whether a pretrial diversion 
program constitutes a conviction. Instead, the court said, while 
pretrial diversion may not be a favorable termination, it is also not 
a conviction or a sentence.209  
McClish also adopted the rationale of Wallace on the question 
of future convictions. The court reasoned that, under Wallace, 
“Heck only comes into play when there has been an outstanding 
criminal judgment or extant conviction, [and] Heck was not raised 
when there was in existence no criminal conviction that the cause 
of action would impugn.”210 The would-be plaintiff, Holmberg, 
would by definition never be convicted because his case was 
already resolved through his entry into, and completion of, the 
 
 204. McClish, 483 F.3d at 1250.  
 205. See id. at 1251 n.19 (citing a prior decision in which a panel of the 
Eleventh Circuit relied on Spencer for the proposition that § 1983 claims were 
only barred when habeas relief remained available). 
 206. See id. at 1250 (“The primary category of cases barred by Heck involved 
suits seeking damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 
imprisonment.”). 
 207. See id. (identifying a second category of cases involving suits to recover 
damages “for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 
conviction or sentence invalid” (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 
(1994))). 
 208. Id. at 1251. 
 209. See id. (“[T]he question is . . . whether Heck applies at all since Holmberg 
was never convicted of any crime.”). 
 210. McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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pretrial diversion program.211 Therefore, “to dismiss this § 1983 
claim as barred by Heck because of a potential conflict that we 
know now with certainty will never materialize would stretch Heck 
beyond the limits of its reasoning.”212 Ultimately the court decided 
that based on these precedents, Holmberg’s pretrial diversion was 
not a conviction necessitating the use of the Heck bar.  
2. No Guilt, No Heck Bar 
The Tenth Circuit took a slightly different approach, focusing 
on the would-be plaintiff’s guilt rather than on a conviction. In 
Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks213 the defendant, Martin Vasquez Arroyo, 
filed two pro se § 1983 actions in the United States District Court 
for the District of Kansas alleging false arrest and the forging of 
his signatures on pretrial diversion agreements.214 The district 
court dismissed the claims, finding them barred by Heck.215 On 
appeal, the Tenth Circuit specifically asked for briefing and 
argument as to “whether the Heck v. Humphrey bar applies to a 
Kansas pre-trial diversion agreement.”216 The court also asked the 
parties to address the question of “whether Heck v. Humphrey 
applies when the plaintiff lacks an available remedy in habeas, in 
light of the circuit split on this issue.”217  
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit first reviewed the 
rationale behind Heck, highlighting the intersection of the habeas 
statute with the § 1983 statute.218 In particular, the Tenth Circuit 
 
 211. See Conviction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The act or 
process of finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been proved 
guilty.”). 
 212. McClish, 483 F.3d at 1252 (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)). 
 213. 589 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 214. See id. at 1092 (describing Vasquez’s allegations, filed in December 2007 
and January 2008 against three different state authorities).  
 215. See Vasquez v. Starks, No. 07-3298-SAC, 2008 WL 11429983, at *1, *3 
(D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2008) (“The court concludes the diversion agreement in question 
is sufficiently analogous to a finding in a criminal action that it is reasonable to 
impose the Heck bar.”). 
 216. Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1093.  
 217. Id.  
 218. See id. (asserting that all nine Justices agreed that the key question in 
Heck was the intersection of habeas with § 1983).  
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cited its own precedent for the proposition that “the purpose 
behind Heck is to prevent litigants from using a § 1983 action, with 
its more lenient pleading rules, to challenge their conviction or 
sentence without complying with the more stringent exhaustion 
requirements for habeas actions.”219 The court then looked at the 
language of Kansas’s pretrial diversion statute which stated that 
“diversion is . . . a means to avoid a judgment of criminal guilt.”220 
Making a key determination, the court characterized this language 
as “the opposite of a conviction in a criminal action.”221 To support 
this reading, the court interpreted Wallace to mean that the Heck 
bar only applies “when there is an actual conviction, not an 
anticipated one.”222 Because Vasquez Arroyo was not adjudged 
guilty, and Heck does not, under Wallace, bar claims purely to 
protect against possible future convictions, the court found that 
Vasquez Arroyo’s claim was not Heck-barred.223 Unfortunately, 
despite the court’s interest in directly addressing the intersection 
of § 1983 claims with the habeas statute, it ultimately decided the 
issue on the first prong of the inquiry, leaving the second question 
for another time.224  
3. No Habeas, No Heck Bar 
Although the Tenth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether 
a § 1983 action applies whenever a plaintiff lacks a habeas 
remedy,225 it noted that the boundaries of this intersection of 
 
 219. Id. at 1094 (citing Butler v. Compton, 482 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir. 
2007)).  
 220. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2906(3) (2008). 
 221. Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1095. 
 222. Id. at 1095; see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (“[T]he 
Heck rule for deferred accrual is called into play only when there exists a 
conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.” (internal citation and 
emphasis omitted)). 
 223. See Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1095 (“Here, there is no related 
underlying conviction that could be invalidated by Mr. Vasquez’s § 1983 
actions.”). 
 224. See id. at 1096 (“Because we have determined that the Kansas pre-trial 
diversion agreements are not outstanding convictions . . . we need not decide 
whether Heck applies when the plaintiff lacks an available remedy in habeas.”). 
 225. See id. (declining to address the intersection of § 1983 and the federal 
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statutes remains an open question.226 And indeed this was exactly 
the question considered by the Sixth Circuit in S.E. v. Grant 
County Board of Education.227 A.E., a juvenile,228 brought a § 1983 
suit in the Eastern District of Kentucky against the Grant County 
Board of Education and several administrators of her school 
system following A.E.’s participation in a diversion program.229 
A.E. entered the program as a way to avoid formal court 
proceedings stemming from her possession and distribution of one 
pill of Adderall, which had been prescribed to her to manage a 
hyperactivity disorder.230 She completed the program, after which 
charges were diverted and dismissed.231 The district court granted 
summary judgment to the defendants on the § 1983 claims “upon 
the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey.”232  
Although the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
findings on other grounds,233 the court clarified that the Heck 
doctrine would not bar a § 1983 claim from an individual who 
completed the state’s pretrial diversion program.234 To reach this 
conclusion, the court reviewed the rationale behind the Heck 
decision, repeating Justice Scalia’s recognition that Heck’s 
favorable termination requirement is analogous to a similar 
requirement in the context of malicious prosecution.235 The court 
 
habeas statute). 
 226. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the issue and 
identifying the ongoing circuit split).  
 227. 544 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 228. Although the juvenile aspect was not important to the court’s 
reasoning here, Kentucky’s pretrial diversion statute now formally adds that 
“[i]f a child successfully completes a diversion agreement, the underlying 
complaint shall be dismissed and further action related to that complainant shall 
be prohibited.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.030(9)(a) (West 2019). 
 229. Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 635.  
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. at 636. 
 232. Id. at 635; S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 522 F. Supp. 2d 826, 833 (E.D. 
Ky. 2007). 
 233. See Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 641 (affirming the district court on the basis 
of qualified immunity). 
 234. See id. at 639 (“Given the facts of this case, where the plaintiff was 
neither convicted nor sentenced and was habeas-ineligible, we hold that Heck is 
inapplicable, and poses no bar to plaintiff’s claims.”). 
 235. See id. at 637 (“The requirement that the conviction or sentence has been 
reversed, expunged, or invalidated is analogous to the similar requirement in the 
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recognized that the Heck bar was intended to prevent duplicative 
or parallel litigation,236 but noted that the would-be plaintiff “was 
never in custody, was not convicted or sentenced, and was never 
eligible for habeas corpus relief.”237 The court focused on whether 
or not habeas was available to A.E., relying on the fact that 
previous circuit precedent had found that “the Heck bar to § 1983 
litigation did not require a favorable termination of the criminal 
proceedings for plaintiffs who were not eligible to make habeas 
petitions.”238 The court thus implicitly followed Justice Souter’s 
approach to the Heck bar.  
However, the Sixth Circuit simultaneously noted that the 
boundaries of the Heck doctrine remained unsettled, and that their 
holding would be in conflict with the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Gilles v. Davis239 and other circuits that held otherwise in the 
non-pretrial-diversion context.240 In fact, two circuits have 
considered the same issue and come to precisely the opposite 
conclusion. 
B. In Two Circuits, Pretrial Diversion Bars Civil Rights Actions 
In contrast to the conclusions drawn by the circuits discussed 
above, both the Second and Third Circuits have held that pretrial 
diversion programs do constitute convictions for purposes of a 
subsequent civil rights action under § 1983.241 The programs 
 
tort of malicious prosecution.”). 
 236. See id. (“This ensures that habeas corpus remains the exclusive 
remedy . . . and does not allow duplicative, collateral attack of convictions or 
sentences through § 1983 actions.”).  
 237. Id. at 638. 
 238. Id. at 639 (citing Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 
592, 603 (6th Cir. 2007); Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 682 (6th Cir. 
2005)). 
 239. 427 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005); see infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Gilles 
in detail). 
 240. See id. (“We announced our disagreement with First, Third, Fifth, and 
Eighth Circuit determinations . . . [that] § 1983 claimants who were not eligible 
for habeas relief remained bound by Heck’s favorable termination requirement.”). 
 241. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 211 (finding that defendant’s participation in a 
pretrial diversion program that may result in criminal prosecution and is not a 
favorable termination); Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 855 (2d Cir. 1992) 
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considered by these circuits are not markedly different from those 
considered by the circuits above. In fact, the Second and Third 
Circuits used similar reasoning and justifications242 in coming to a 
conclusion diametrically opposite to that of the Sixth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits.243 
1. If Guilt Is Still Undetermined, There Is No Right to Bring Suit 
Under Section 1983  
The Second Circuit decided Roesch v. Otarola244 in November 
1992, prior to the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Heck. Although 
the decision out of the Second Circuit predates the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heck,245 it squarely addressed the legal issue of 
whether participation in a pretrial diversion program constitutes 
a conviction,246 and the case is generally cited as adhering to one 
side of the circuit split.247 Carl Roesch filed a § 1983 action in the 
 
(affirming the district court because the underlying criminal charge was not 
dismissed or set aside in favor of the defendant).  
 242.  Compare Gilles, 427 F.3d at 209 (“By entering the . . . program, the 
defendant waives his right to prove his innocence, but at the same time, does not 
admit guilt.”), and Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852 (reasoning that the program completed 
by the defendant still “leaves open the question of the accused’s guilt”), with 
Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[U]nder Kansas 
law a diversion is a means to avoid a judgment of criminal guilt.” (citation 
omitted)), S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2008) (“A.E. 
was never in custody [and] was not convicted or sentenced.”), and McClish v. 
Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]here was never a conviction in 
the first place.”).  
 243. See infra Part IV.D (cataloguing the elements cited by the circuits). 
 244. 980 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 245. Roesch was decided in 1992; the Supreme Court handed down their 
decision in Heck in 1994.  
 246. See Roesch, 980 F.2d at 853 (“[W]e hold [the] trial rehabilitation program 
is not a termination in favor of the accused for purposes of a civil rights suit.”). 
 247. See, e.g., BRIAN R. MEANS, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 11:5 (2018) (“The 
Second and Third Circuits have gone even further in ruling that Heck applies 
even if the plaintiff successfully completes the pretrial diversion program.”); 
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, 2018-2 
SUPPLEMENT (2018) (identifying a “division of authority” in determining whether 
pretrial diversion counted as a conviction for purposes of the Heck doctrine and 
collecting cases). But see Huval v. La. State Univ. Police Dep’t, 
No. 16-00553-BAJ-RLB, 2018 WL 1095559, at *11, *12 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2018) 
(identifying a circuit split between the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits on one 
hand, and the Third Circuit on the other, without citing the Second Circuit’s 
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United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against 
various parties including a police officer, alleging that the parties 
conspired to arrest him without probable cause and to revoke his 
probation.248 His suit stemmed from a 1986 arrest for breach of the 
peace and threatening and harassing his wife’s family.249 
Following his arrest, but prior to trial, a state judge admitted 
Roesch into Connecticut’s accelerated pretrial rehabilitation 
program, which Roesch successfully completed in two years.250 
Following completion of the program, all charges against Roesch 
were dismissed.251 He then filed his § 1983 suit.252 Finding that “a 
disposition pursuant to Connecticut’s accelerated pretrial 
rehabilitation statute was not a termination in the appellant’s 
favor,” the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants,253 and Roesch appealed.254  
The Second Circuit cited several factors in concluding that 
Roesch’s participation in a pretrial diversion program following his 
1986 arrest precluded him from bringing a § 1983 action relating 
to that arrest.255 First, circuit precedent in Singleton v. City of New 
York256 (which discussed a similar New York statute) had 
previously held that “adjournment in contemplation of dismissal” 
was not a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious 
prosecution claim.257 Singleton’s precedent was based on the 
concept that an adjournment “leaves open the question of the 
accused’s guilt.”258 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the 
 
decision in Roesch). 
 248. See Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852 (listing Roesch’s allegations and claims). The 
revoked probation stemmed from an earlier, unrelated conviction. Id. 
 249. See id. (summarizing Roesch’s charges for mailing offensive post cards 
and yelling obscenities at his wife’s family in public). 
 250. See id. (“After Roesch successfully completed the two-year probationary 
period, the State Court dismissed the charges against him.”). 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 851.  
 254. Id. at 852.  
 255. See Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 852–54 (2d Cir. 1992) (addressing 
the precedential, policy-based, and analogous reasons to affirm the district court).  
 256. 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 257. Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852 (citing Singleton, 632 F.2d at 195). 
 258. Id. 
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program considered in Singleton “provide[d] a method for those 
charged . . . by behaving well and abiding by the judge’s 
instructions during a designated period to demonstrate that the 
charges should not be pursued.”259 Because the court concluded 
that the two pretrial diversion programs—Connecticut and New 
York—were materially the same, the Singleton precedent held 
significant weight.260 This was true despite the court expressly 
noting that completion of the program resulted in dismissal, and 
complete erasure, of all charges.261 To bring a § 1983 claim, the 
court said, would require that the defendant either “pursue the 
criminal case to an acquittal” or receive “an unqualified 
dismissal.”262 
The Second Circuit also considered the practical policy 
implications of allowing the § 1983 action to proceed, noting that if 
offenders were allowed to pursue civil rights actions, prosecutors 
would be less interested in allowing offenders into the program.263 
In particular, the program would be “less desirable for the State to 
retain and less desirable for the courts to use because the savings 
in resources from dismissing the criminal proceeding would be 
consumed in resolving the constitutional claims.”264  
 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. at 853–54 (extensively discussing Singleton and the similarities 
between the issues presented in that case and the case before the court with 
reference to both pretrial diversion statutes). 
 261. See id. at 853 (“A person who thinks there is not even probable cause to 
believe he committed the crime with which he is charged must pursue the 
criminal case to an acquittal or an unqualified dismissal, or else waive his section 
1983 claim.”).  
 262. Id. The court also said that a § 1983 claim cannot allege harm on the 
basis of unfairness, only on a violation of due process, and that a pretrial diversion 
program is not a violation of due process. Id. at 854.  
 263. See id. at 853 (“If we permit a criminal defendant to maintain a section 
1983 action after taking advantage of accelerated rehabilitation, the program, 
intended to give first-time offenders a second chance, would become less desirable 
for the State to retain.”). 
 264. Id. 
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2. If Not Clearly Innocent, Heck Bar Applies 
Several years later, in Gilles v. Davis,265 Timothy Petit and 
James Gilles filed a § 1983 suit in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking damages 
following an arrest for resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and 
failure to disperse.266 Petit was released almost immediately after 
the arrest and entered into Pennsylvania’s Accelerated 
Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program,267 “which permits 
expungement of the criminal record upon successful completion of 
a probationary term.”268 Petit completed the program and all 
charges were indeed expunged.269 In the § 1983 action, however, 
the district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, stating that Petit’s claims were barred under Heck270 
and that expungement was not a favorable termination.271 Petit 
appealed.272  
The Third Circuit immediately turned to the language of 
Pennsylvania’s pretrial diversion program.273 The court 
acknowledged that, according to the statute, an ARD participant 
“avoids trial and potential jail time,”274 and added that “the 
purpose of the ARD program is to rehabilitate offenders and 
promptly dispose of minor criminal charges.”275 Furthermore, the 
 
 265. 427 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 266. See id. at 202 (describing the arrest of Gilles for preaching against 
homosexual activity on a college campus and the arrest of Petit for videotaping 
the activity). 
 267. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 301 (2005) (specifying procedures used in 
Pennsylvania’s pretrial diversion program).  
 268. Gilles, 427 F.3d at 202.  
 269. See id. at 209 (“After a successful probationary period, the charges were 
expunged from [Petit’s] criminal record.”).  
 270. See id. at 208 (“The District Court held that Petit’s claims were barred 
under [Heck].”).  
 271. See id. at 209 (“The District Court found . . . that under Heck 
expungement under the ARD Program is not a result ‘favorable’ to the plaintiff.”). 
 272. See id. at 201 (tracing the claims and issues asserted by the 
plaintiff-appellants in the lower court). 
 273. See id. at 209 (citing the language of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the accompanying comments).  
 274. Id.  
 275. Id. at 209 n.9.  
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court noted that ARD participation “is not intended to constitute a 
conviction.”276 The court then considered how the statute 
approaches the question of guilt, stating that “[b]y entering the 
ARD program, the defendant waives his right to prove his 
innocence, but at the same time, does not admit guilt.”277 Indeed, 
the court explained, “both a guilty plea and an ARD are sufficient 
to bar a subsequent § 1983 claim.”278 Of course, if both an ARD 
diversion program and a guilty plea are sufficient, participation in 
the pretrial program must constitute something different than a 
plea of guilt. 
Nonetheless, the court pointed out that the Heck bar was 
intended to prevent parallel litigation or the possibility of “two 
conflicting resolutions arising from the same transaction.”279 Then, 
the court cited to the Second Circuit’s opinion in Roesch280 and a 
Fifth Circuit opinion, Taylor v. Gregg,281 which both held that 
similar pretrial diversion programs were not favorable 
terminations.282 Based on these considerations, the court 
concluded that “the ARD program imposes several burdens upon 
the criminal defendant not consistent with innocence.”283 Although 
the court noted that “the strongest factor supporting the 
contention that ARD is a favorable termination is that successful 
completion of the ARD program results in dismissal of the criminal 
charge and expungement of the arrest record,”284 those 
considerations did not outweigh other factors discussed.285  
 
 276. Id. at 209.  
 277. Id.  
 278. Id. at 209 n.8. 
 279. Id. at 209.  
 280. Id. at 211. The Gilles court also traced Roesch’s reliance on Singleton, 
which determined that a similar program “le[ft] open the question of guilt.” Id. 
 281. 36 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 282. See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We find instructive 
opinions from the Second and Fifth Circuits that have addressed whether similar 
pre-trial probationary programs are a favorable termination sufficient to bring a 
subsequent civil suit.”).  
 283. Id. The court also said that probation is “an ‘unfavorable’ period of 
judicially imposed limitations on freedom.” Id.  
 284.  Id. at 212 n.14. 
 285. See id. (“For the reasons noted, however, we believe the ARD program is 
not a favorable termination under Heck.”). 
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The Gilles opinion is particularly notable for its somewhat 
reluctant application of the Heck bar to Petit’s claims. When 
considering whether Petit’s lack of habeas relief affected his access 
to § 1983 actions,286 the court acknowledged that a plurality of 
Supreme Court Justices questioned the use of a Heck bar in such 
cases.287 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit refused to challenge 
current law and precedent.288 Instead, the court explicitly stated 
that it would consider itself bound until the Supreme Court itself 
unquestionably overrules or clarifies Heck.289 Meanwhile, in a 
dissent, Judge Fuentes argued that the Heck bar could not apply 
to Petit because he was not in custody and did not have access to 
relief under the habeas statute.290 Judge Fuentes gathered the 
votes contained in the various Spencer opinions291 and concluded 
that “[u]nder the best reading of Heck and [Spencer], the favorable 
termination rule does not apply where habeas relief is 
unavailable.”292 Judge Fuentes explained that several circuits have 
 
 286. See id. at 210 (mulling the precedential value of the various piecemeal 
opinions arising from Spencer on the issue of the intersection of the § 1983 and 
habeas statutes). 
 287. See id. at 209–10 (“We recognize that concurring and dissenting opinions 
in [Spencer] question the applicability of Heck to an individual, such as Petit, who 
has no recourse under the habeas statute.”); see also Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 
1, 21 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring) (“The better view, then, is that a former 
prisoner, no longer in custody, may bring a § 1983 action establishing the 
unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement . . . .”); id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“Given the Court’s holding that petitioner does not have a remedy 
under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter explains, that he 
may bring an action under § 1983.”). 
 288. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 210 (“We join our sister courts . . . in following the 
Supreme Court’s admonition . . . to follow its directly applicable precedent, even 
if that precedent appears weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent 
decisions.” (citations omitted)). 
 289. See id. at 210 (“[We] leave to the Court the prerogative of overruling its 
own decisions.” (citations omitted)). 
 290. See id. at 212 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (“Heck’s favorable termination 
rule cannot be applied to dismiss a § 1983 claim brought by a plaintiff not in 
custody.” (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 500 (1994))). 
 291. See id. at 217 (“Justice Souter’s concurrence in Spencer was joined by 
Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Stevens dissented but indicated 
that ‘it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter explains, that a petitioner who does 
not have a remedy under the habeas statute may bring an action under [§ 1983].’” 
(citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 292. Id.  
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adopted Justice Souter’s narrower interpretation of the favorable 
termination rule293 and argued that, in his view, “the District 
Court erred when it applied Heck without considering whether 
Petit could have brought his claim under habeas.”294 Judge 
Fuentes also pointed out that the majority’s opinion relied heavily 
on two cases that pre-dated Heck, including the Second Circuit’s 
opinion in Roesch.295 Although the majority opinion in Heck relied 
on an analogy to malicious prosecution in explicating its 
rationale,296 Judge Fuentes instead read Heck as “extend[ing] the 
scope of the favorable termination rule in order to reconcile § 1983 
with the federal habeas statute.”297  
Gilles and Roesch present clear examples of the confusion 
surrounding the circuit split addressed in this Note. Although 
Gilles hinted at a willingness to allow a § 1983 action to proceed 
following participation in a pretrial diversion program, at least in 
certain circumstances, the court was hamstrung by the precedents 
coming out of the Supreme Court’s competing opinions in Heck and 
Spencer.298 Although Roesch predates Heck, the rationale still 
supports the use of the Heck bar for pretrial diversion 
participants.299 Moreover, comparing Gilles and Roesch with the 
cases out of the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits highlights the 
precedential morass that surrounds the issue. The five circuits 
discussed above are alike only in that not one is able to fully 
articulate the state of the law. Such is the situation Christopher 
DeLeon faced when deciding whether to accept entry into a pretrial 
diversion program. 
 
 293. See id. at 218 (summarizing cases out of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits allowing § 1983 actions because they would not interfere with the 
purpose of the habeas statute). 
 294. Id.  
 295. See id. (pointing out that both Roesch and Singleton were handed down 
prior to 1994).  
 296. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (“The common-law 
cause of action for malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy to claims of 
the type considered here.”). 
 297. Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 219 (3d Cir. 2005) (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 298. See supra notes 287–289 and accompanying text (highlighting the court’s 
reluctance to take a stance while the Supreme Court’s position remains unclear). 
 299. See, e.g., Gilles, 427 F.3d at 211 (relying on the reasoning used in Roesch 
to justify its own conclusions). 
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C. An Undecided Circuit: Ongoing Diversion Bars Heck 
DeLeon’s situation, granted, was somewhat unique. For one 
thing, his pretrial diversion program consisted of a ten year 
probationary period.300 For another, pretrial diversion programs 
tend to be used for misdemeanor offenses, not for anything as 
severe as an assault on a police officer.301 One could easily 
speculate as to the kinds of prosecutorial decision-making that 
went into trying to keep DeLeon’s civil rights complaint quiet by 
offering him pretrial diversion instead. Although the Fifth Circuit 
declined to allow DeLeon’s § 1983 lawsuit to proceed at that time, 
the court did leave open the possibility of joining the approach 
taken by the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.302 Furthermore, 
the Fifth Circuit recognized and clearly laid out the split in circuit 
court jurisprudence on this precise issue.303 Given the Fifth 
Circuit’s prior jurisprudence in Taylor, however, it seems that the 
court is more likely to join the approach taken by the Second and 
Third Circuits if and when the issue is more directly presented. 
In DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, the case presented at the 
beginning of this Note, Christopher DeLeon appealed the dismissal 
of his § 1983 claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, and use of excessive force in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas.304 At the time of the 
decision, DeLeon had not completed his pretrial diversion 
requirements;305 if successfully completed, the charge against him 
would be dropped.306 The district court reasoned that DeLeon’s 
pretrial diversion did not count as a favorable termination under 
the terms of Heck and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.307  
 
 300. Supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text. 
 301. Supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text. 
 302. Infra note 308 and accompanying text. 
 303. Infra notes 309–314 and accompanying text.  
 304. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 305. See id. at 653 (using the future tense to explain that DeLeon’s charges 
“will be” dismissed). 
 306. Id. 
 307. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, C.A. No. C-05-096, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 44191, at *2, *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005). 
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Taking up the appeal, the Fifth Circuit first revisited its own 
precedents, in which deferred adjudication was treated as the 
equivalent of a conviction for sentencing purposes.308 The court 
found those precedents non-binding, however, terming them “pure 
exercises in statutory interpretation” based on reading the 
sentencing guidelines as “anticipat[ing] deferred prosecutions and 
pleas of nolo contendere where a conviction is not formally 
entered.”309 Instead, the court turned to the rationale behind the 
Heck doctrine, highlighting the use of the words “conviction or 
sentence” in Heck’s majority opinion.310 Reading Heck, the Fifth 
Circuit found that “[f]irst, an order deferring adjudication, though 
not formally a conviction or sentence, is its functional equivalent 
in light of Heck’s rationale. Second, an order deferring adjudication 
is, at least, one stage in an ongoing state criminal proceeding, 
which Heck’s rationale might protect.”311 The court then explicitly 
laid out the competing rationales of Heck, as espoused by Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion (centered on narrowing the reach of the 
§ 1983 statute by analogizing to malicious prosecution actions)312 
and Justice Souter’s concurrence (focused on the intersection of 
§ 1983 actions with the habeas statute).313 Faced with these two 
competing approaches, the court firmly chose the former, writing 
that “[t]his circuit remains in the first camp, where Heck stands 
first for ‘the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not 
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding 
criminal judgments.’ In short, the common law animated Heck, and 
so it lights our way today.”314 Under this approach, the court 
mused, the possibility of a future criminal proceeding might act as 
 
 308. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 652 (citing United States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272 
(5th Cir. 1997); Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2005)).  
 309. Id.  
 310. See id. (“When a plaintiff alleges tort claims against his arresting 
officers, the district court must first consider whether a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” 
(citation omitted, emphasis in original)). 
 311. Id. at 654.  
 312. See supra notes 148–155 and accompanying text (discussing the Heck 
majority opinion). 
 313. See supra notes 156–163 and accompanying text (discussing the Heck 
concurrence). 
 314. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 654 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 
(1994)).  
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a rationale for barring a subsequent action, since such was the rule 
for malicious prosecution cases historically.315 However, after the 
Supreme Court foreclosed this approach in Wallace,316 the “ongoing 
criminal state criminal proceedings” rationale “lacks merit.”317 
Still, the court concluded, the statute suggests that a deferred 
adjudication order, which must be signed by a judge, constitutes a 
final judicial act.318 This conclusion was supported by prior 
decisions by Texas state courts,319 which had previously concluded 
that under Texas law “there was a judicial finding that the 
evidence substantiated the defendants [sic] guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but not a judicial finding of guilt.”320 The inquiry 
into DeLeon’s case could go no further while he remained in the 
program.321 This, plus the judge’s ability to impose a variety of 
conditions on the defendant,322 was enough for the court to declare 
that “a deferred adjudication order is a conviction for the purposes 
of Heck’s favorable termination rule.”323 The Fifth Circuit did 
explicitly state, however, that it was not addressing the question 
of whether a completed deferred adjudication program would also 
act to bar a § 1983 action.324 Further, the court modified the district 
 
 315. See id. at 655 (“Actions in malicious prosecution were also dismissed, 
however, where there was any pending criminal proceeding.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 316. See supra notes 180–193 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Wallace). 
 317. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 655 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 318. See id. at 656 (“[A]lthough the Texas courts have in all circumstances 
held that these orders are not convictions, they have been accorded finality, for 
instance in the appellate context . . . .”). 
 319. See id. at 653 (surveying Texas lower courts, the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals, and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). 
 320. Id. 
 321. See id. (“The proceedings halted at this juncture and were then simply 
deferred.”).  
 322.  See id. at 656 n.33 (“The judge may . . . require any reasonable 
conditions of community supervision . . . that a judge could impose on a defendant 
placed on community supervision for a conviction that was probated and 
suspended, including conviction.” (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, 
sec. 5(a) (West 2007))). 
 323. Id. at 656.  
 324. See id. (“This case does not require that we decide whether a successfully 
completed deferred adjudication, with its more limited collateral consequences 
under Texas law, is also a conviction for the purposes of Heck, and we do not 
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court’s order of dismissal to make clear that the complaint was 
dismissed with prejudice only until the defendant could meet the 
threshold conditions required to bring a § 1983 suit without 
violating the Heck bar.325 Simultaneously the court put forth the 
possibility that DeLeon might have access to the habeas statute 
after completing the terms of his deferred adjudication.326 In other 
words, following DeLeon the Fifth Circuit remains unresolved as 
to whether completion of a pretrial diversion program would be 
sufficient to bar a subsequent § 1983 action under Heck. 
Although DeLeon is the most recent case out of the Fifth 
Circuit, additional guidance as to how the court might rule on a 
plaintiff who, unlike DeLeon, completed his pretrial diversion 
program before bringing a § 1983 claim comes from the circuit’s 
earlier decision in Taylor v. Gregg. The Taylor case, handed down 
just months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck, involved 
an action for malicious prosecution in which the defendants 
entered pretrial diversion programs before bringing their 
claims.327 The court explained that “pre-trial diversion is an 
alternative to prosecution that diverts certain offenders from 
traditional criminal justice processing into a program of 
supervision.”328 Furthermore, the court differentiated between 
acknowledging responsibility, as required to enter the program, 
versus admitting guilt, which the program does not require.329 The 
issue before the court was “whether a pre-trial diversion 
agreement terminates the criminal action in the plaintiff’s favor” 
such that the plaintiff might bring a malicious prosecution 
claim.330 Although the issue was, at the time, an issue of first 
 
decide that question.”). 
 325. See id. at 657 (“A preferred order of dismissal in Heck cases decrees, 
‘Plaintiffs claims are dismissed with prejudice to their being asserted again until 
the Heck conditions are met.’ We will modify the judgment accordingly.” (citation 
omitted)).  
 326. See id. (“We do not decide whether DeLeon . . . otherwise may pursue 
federal habeas relief by successfully completing his deferred adjudication.”). 
 327. See Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Thereafter, 
Appellants entered into a pre-trial diversion agreement with the United States 
Attorney’s Office. Appellants subsequently filed suit.”). 
 328. Id. 
 329. See id. (“The offenders must acknowledge responsibility for their actions, 
but need not admit guilt.”). 
 330. Id.  
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impression for the Fifth Circuit,331 the court drew inspiration from 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Singleton.332 Relying largely on 
reasons of public policy,333 the Fifth Circuit adopted the Second 
Circuit’s reasoning in holding that “[e]ntering a pretrial-diversion 
agreement does not terminate the criminal action in favor of the 
criminal defendant.”334 Based on this reasoning, it seems likely 
that even if DeLeon had completed his pretrial diversion program, 
the Fifth Circuit may have followed its own reasoning in Taylor in 
determining that the potential chilling effect of allowing a § 1983 
action to proceed would be enough of a deterrent to hold DeLeon’s 
claim barred under Heck. After all, the Second Circuit similarly 
based its decision in Roesch on its earlier decision in Singleton in 
concluding that § 1983 actions would be barred for pretrial 
diversion participants.335 
D. Elements Considered by the Circuit Courts 
As seen from the case summaries above, the circuits 
considered a wide variety of rationales in assessing the question of 
the Heck bar in the context of pretrial diversion. The Third, Fifth, 
and Sixth Circuits explicitly followed the reasoning of the Heck 
majority, which weighed the importance of avoiding parallel 
litigation by analogizing to the tort of malicious prosecution.336 
 
 331. See id. (“The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether a pre-trial 
diversion agreement is a favorable termination of a criminal action for purposes 
of maintaining a malicious prosecution claim.”). 
 332. See id. at 455–56 (tracing the reasoning of Singleton in determining that 
“an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal is far from being in all respects 
favorable to the defendant” (citations omitted)). 
 333. See id. at 456 (describing the “chilling effect” on prosecutorial willingness 
to allow pretrial diversion if doing so would leave the door open to collateral 
attacks).  
 334. Id.  
 335. See Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 851–54 (2d Cir. 1992) (comparing 
Roesch’s case to the facts and legal precedent of Singleton throughout the 
discussion and analysis). 
 336. See S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 637 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(“The requirement that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, 
or invalidated is analogous to the similar requirement in the tort of malicious 
prosecution and is called the ‘favorable termination’ requirement of Heck.”); 
DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Our 
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Two circuits, the Sixth and Eleventh, highlighted the fact that no 
sentence was imposed in the pretrial programs at issue.337 All 
circuits acknowledged that there is no formal conviction involved 
under the statutory language of the specific pretrial diversion 
programs considered, though the language used by the circuits 
varies.338 For example, the Second Circuit found that the 
Connecticut program “leaves open the question of guilt,”339 while 
the Third Circuit reasoned that the a defendant participating in 
the Pennsylvania program is neither guilty nor innocent.340 The 
Fifth Circuit considered the Texas diversion program to be the 
“functional equivalent” of a conviction.341 
Five of the circuits (Third, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh) 
considered the alternate possibility of habeas relief,342 although 
 
decisional path begins at Heck itself. The Heck Court held that a civil tort action, 
including an action under section 1983, is not an appropriate vehicle for 
challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.”); Gilles v. Davis, 427 
F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In Heck, the Court held a § 1983 malicious 
prosecution claim was subject to the common law requirement that the plaintiff 
show the prior criminal proceeding terminated in his favor.”). 
 337. See Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 636 (“We note that in [the cited case], the 
plaintiff had been sentenced, unlike in the instant case.”); McClish v. Nugent, 483 
F.3d 1231, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he charge was eventually dismissed without 
prejudice pursuant to Florida’s pretrial intervention program.”). 
 338. See Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The 
diversion agreements resulted in deferral of prosecution of the offenses at issue. 
As a consequence, under Kansas law there are no outstanding judgments or 
convictions or sentences.”); Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 636 (“A.E. was charged in 
juvenile court with a trafficking violation that was diverted and dismissed after 
A.E. satisfied her diversion contract.”); DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 654 (“With deferred 
adjudication, there is no judgment of conviction and no sentence.”); McClish, 483 
F.3d at 1251 (“Holmberg was never convicted of any crime.”); Gilles, 427 F.3d at 
211 (describing the diversionary period as “an ‘unfavorable’ period of judicially 
imposed limitations on freedom in which the probationer’s violation of the 
program’s terms may result in criminal prosecution”); Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852–
53 (“If the accused meets the conditions set by the court, the charges are 
dismissed, and all records of the charges are erased pursuant to [the statute].”). 
 339. Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852.  
 340. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 209 (“By entering the . . . program, the defendant 
waives his right to prove his innocence, but at the same time, does not admit 
guilt.”). 
 341. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 654.  
 342. See Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1094 (reviewing the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the intersection of habeas with § 1983); Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 
639 (revisiting a prior case in which the Fifth Circuit had considered the 
intersection of the habeas and § 1983 statutes); DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 654 
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only the Third and Sixth Circuits addressed it explicitly. Both of 
those circuits found that the defendant before them did not have 
recourse to habeas relief. However, they then came to opposite 
conclusions. For the Sixth Circuit, a lack of habeas relief meant 
that a § 1983 action should be available,343 while for the Third 
Circuit the lack of habeas relief did not change the unavailability 
of § 1983.344 Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit gestured at the 
habeas remedy discussion in Spencer, but did not rely on it.345 
Although the courts’ reasoning tended to rely on the elements 
above, the courts also considered both circuit precedent and the 
purpose of the pretrial diversion statutes, aspects which 
necessarily vary by jurisdiction. For example, the Second, Third, 
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits considered persuasive authority either 
from their own related decisions,346 opinions in other circuits,347 or 
similarly situated state courts.348 This played a particularly 
 
(acknowledging and dismissing Justice Souter’s concurring rationale in Spencer 
v. Kenma); McClish, 483 F.3d at 1251 n.19 (“The logic of our reasoning . . . is clear: 
If Heck only bars § 1983 claims when the alternative remedy of habeas corpus is 
available, then Heck has no application to Holmberg’s claim.”); Gilles, 427 F.3d at 
209 (“We recognize that concurring and dissenting opinions in Spencer v. Kenma 
question the applicability of Heck to an individual, such as Petit, who has no 
recourse under the habeas statute.” (citation omitted)). 
 343. See Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 639 (“[W]e announced our disagreement with 
[other circuit courts] that, in spite of the Spencer decision, § 1983 claimants who 
were not eligible for habeas relief remained bound by Heck’s favorable 
termination requirement.”). 
 344. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 210 (“But these opinions do not affect our 
conclusion that Heck applies to Petit’s claims.”). 
 345. See McClish, 483 F.3d at 1251 n.19 (citing a prior case in which the 
circuit court interpreted the Supreme Court’s opinions in Spencer v. Kenma as a 
majority of the Court “express[ing] the view that § 1983 claims are barred only 
when the alternative remedy of habeas relief is available”). 
 346. See Grant Cty., 544 F.3d at 637–39 (citing the reasoning from two prior 
Sixth Circuit cases); Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1992) (“We are 
unpersuaded that these previously rejected arguments form a basis for 
distinguishing the Connecticut provision, and we have no authority to reconsider 
the holding in Singleton.”). 
 347. See S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2008 
(exploring the reasoning in Gilles); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“We find instructive opinions from the Second and Fifth Circuits that have 
addressed whether similar pretrial probationary programs are a favorable 
termination sufficient to bring a subsequent civil suit.”).  
 348. See DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 653–55 (5th Cir. 
2007) (citing similar opinions by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the 
1814 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1763 (2019) 
interesting role in the Third Circuit decision, Gilles, in which the 
court suggested that it might otherwise allow a § 1983 action to 
proceed, but felt bound by the language of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Heck.349 Meanwhile, the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits 
assessed the purpose of the relevant pretrial diversion statute to 
determine whether the legislature intended the program to be 
considered a conviction.350 These jurisdiction-specific rationales, 
which further muddied the waters of the circuit split, are another 
reason a coherent resolution of the split would benefit the lower 
courts and the defendants seeking to access them.  
V. Three Proposals for Resolving the Split 
Given the confusion in the lower courts described above, the 
Supreme Court must now step in to settle this area of law. Several 
approaches hinted at in the decisions above offer possible paths. 
These include the habeas-centric approach espoused by Judge 
Fuentes, dissenting in part in Gilles v. Davis,351 the 
future-conviction approach discussed by Justice Scalia in Wallace 
v. Kato,352 and the distinction between “challenges to procedures” 
 
Missouri Supreme Court, and the California Supreme Court).  
 349. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 210 (“We doubt that Heck has been undermined, 
but to the extent its continued validity has been called into question, 
we . . . follow[] the Supreme Court’s admonition to lower federal courts to follow 
its directly applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened . . . .” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 350. See Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(“[U]nder Kansas law a diversion is a means to avoid a judgment of criminal guilt, 
the opposite of a conviction in a criminal action.”); DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 655 
(“Deferred adjudication was not intended as a radical departure, rather, the 
Texas legislature enacted these procedures with the purpose to remove from 
existing statutes the limitations that have acted as barriers to effective systems 
of community supervision.” (citation and internal ellipses omitted)); Gilles, 427 
F.3d at 209 (“The Comment to Rule 312 of the [statute] states that ‘acceptance 
into an ARD program is not intended to constitute a conviction,’ but ‘it may be 
statutorily construed as a conviction for purposes of computing sentences on 
subsequent convictions.’” (citing PA. R. CRIM. P. 312)). 
 351. See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 212 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder Heck and 
Spencer . . . Heck’s favorable termination rule cannot be applied to dismiss a 
§ 1983 claim brought by a plaintiff not in custody.”). 
 352. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (“What petitioner seeks, in 
other words, is the adoption of a principle that goes well beyond Heck: that an 
action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought 
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and “challenges to judgments” mentioned in McClish.353 These 
possible resolutions will be assessed in turn. 
A. Exploring the Intersection of Federal Habeas and Section 1983 
The first proposal traces the split between the Heck majority 
rationale and Justice Souter’s Heck concurrence, a dichotomy 
which is clearly laid out in Judge Fuentes’s dissent in Gilles. Judge 
Fuentes summarized his dissent in Gilles by saying that “under 
Heck and Spencer . . . Heck’s favorable termination rule cannot be 
applied to dismiss a § 1983 claim brought by a plaintiff not in 
custody.”354 Indeed, Judge Fuentes characterized the majority’s 
opinion dismissing the plaintiff’s claim as based on a faulty 
assumption that the Heck question even applied to his situation.355 
On the contrary, Judge Fuentes suggested, a proper reading of 
Heck and Spencer requires that “the favorable termination rule 
does not apply where habeas relief is unavailable.”356 Judge 
Fuentes’s approach directly picked up where Justice Souter left off 
in Spencer, reiterating the importance of “avoid[ing] collisions at 
the intersection of habeas and § 1983.”357 Indeed, the majority 
opinion in McClish took the same approach, arguing that the 
plaintiff’s suit “does not represent the sort of collateral attack 
foreclosed by Heck for the straightforward reason that it is not 
collateral to anything—the § 1983/habeas conflict addressed in 
 
until that conviction occurs and is set aside. The impracticality of such a rule 
should be obvious.”). 
 353. See McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007)  
The primary category of cases barred by Heck involved suits seeking 
damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment. 
However, the Court also noted that a second category of cases—suits 
to recover damages “for other harm caused by actions whose 
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid”—raised 
similar conflicts. (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). 
 354. Gilles, 427 F.3d at 212 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  
 355. See id. at 216 (“Like the District Court, the majority assumes that the 
favorable termination rule in Heck applies to Petit’s claim. But because Petit was 
not in custody when he filed his § 1983 action, Heck does not apply.”). 
 356. Id. at 217. 
 357. Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1, 20 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring).  
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Heck is nonexistent when, as here, there was never a conviction in 
the first place.”358  
This habeas-centric approach is an appealing resolution to the 
split because of its simplicity and the clear, bright-line rule it offers 
for courts. Under this approach, if the plaintiff bringing a § 1983 
action is not in custody at the time, the Heck doctrine does not bar 
his or her suit. All of the plaintiffs in the cases above, therefore, 
would have access to the courts through § 1983, as none of them 
were in custody at the time they initiated their suit. This includes 
Christopher DeLeon, who was still participating in his pretrial 
diversion program but who was not officially in custody and, as the 
Fifth Circuit acknowledged, was without access to a habeas 
proceeding.359 Furthermore, this approach allows more access to 
the courts for plaintiffs who have a justifiable claim against a state 
actor for the deprivation of rights. A plaintiff who can assert a 
legitimate claim under § 1983, like DeLeon, should not be unduly 
barred by a threshold issue such as the Heck doctrine. Such a bar 
subverts the very purpose of § 1983, which exists in part to protect 
individuals against abuses of power by the state.360  
One limitation to this approach, however, is that participants 
still enrolled in a pretrial diversion program remain eligible to 
have charges re-filed against them, should they fail to complete the 
program successfully. Because the burden of a civil suit at the 
same time the plaintiff remains under threat of conviction is 
exactly what Heck was intended to guard against,361 a resolution 
along these lines might require that plaintiffs remain barred by 
the Heck doctrine until they have completed their pretrial 
diversion successfully. Another limitation is that a habeas-centric 
approach to Heck cases involving pretrial diversion programs 
would not actually legally define pretrial diversion programs as 
“convictions” or “not convictions” in a meaningful way. In other 
 
 358. McClish, 483 F.3d at 1251.  
 359. See supra notes 304–307 and accompanying text (enumerating the 
specifics of DeLeon’s case). 
 360. See supra Part II.A (discussing the enactment and purpose of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, including the § 1983 cause of action). 
 361. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (“This requirement 
avoids parallel litigation . . . and precludes the possibility of the claimant 
succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying 
criminal prosecution.”). 
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words, taking such an approach would have little, if any, impact 
on the question of whether a pretrial diversion program constitutes 
(or rather, should constitute) a conviction for purposes of 
sentencing, immigration, or other subsequent suits.  
Finally, the most significant barrier to taking this approach is 
that it does nothing to resolve the debate over whether to follow 
the rationale of the Heck majority or that of Justice Souter’s Heck 
concurrence and the pieced together Spencer “majority.” Indeed, an 
entirely different circuit split has sprung up around this debate.362 
While the bright line rule is appealing in theory, it would therefore 
likely be ineffective in practice. 
B. Focusing on Anticipated Future Convictions 
A second resolution would take inspiration from Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Wallace, in which he criticized the idea 
that the Heck bar could be extended to cover “action[s] which would 
impugn an anticipated future conviction.”363 In Wallace, the 
petitioner tried to argue that the statute of limitations for his 
§ 1983 suit was tolled until any possibility of conviction was set 
aside.364 According to the petitioner’s argument, the Heck doctrine 
implied that if there was any possible future cause of action that 
might bar his § 1983 suit, the statute of limitations could not 
possibly accrue until all of those potential future convictions either 
took place (thereby barring the suit) or were invalidated (thereby 
allowing the suit to go forward).365 Justice Scalia maligned the 
highly uncertain nature of this inquiry, noting that “[t]he 
impracticality of such a speculative rule is obvious.”366  
However, following Justice Scalia’s reasoning leads to 
interesting implications for the Heck bar in the context of pretrial 
 
 362. See, e.g., Defining the Reach, supra note 134, at 868 (analyzing the circuit 
split over whether an individual’s access to habeas necessarily bars a subsequent 
§ 1983 suit).  
 363. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (emphasis in original).  
 364. See id. at 391 (“This would end the matter, were it not for petitioner’s 
contention that Heck v. Humphrey compels the conclusion that his suit could not 
accrue until the State dropped its charges against him.” (citation omitted)).  
 365. Id. at 393. 
 366. Id. at 385. 
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diversion programs. If a speculative, future conviction is clearly no 
bar to a § 1983 action under Heck, a pretrial diversion program 
that leaves open the possibility of charges while the program is in 
process should not be a bar, either. Of course, the possibility of 
charges being re-filed during participation in a pretrial diversion 
program is much less speculative than the future convictions that 
Justice Scalia imagined in Wallace. Nonetheless, the boundary 
that Justice Scalia placed on Heck in Wallace—that future 
convictions are not contemplated by the Heck bar—might lead to 
creative, if somewhat attenuated, arguments that pretrial 
diversion programs only create the possibility of conviction, not a 
conviction in and of itself.  
To put this in context, consider Christopher DeLeon, who was 
given a ten year probation as part of a deferred adjudication 
program.367 DeLeon filed a § 1983 action while still serving his 
probation, and remained under the threat of a possible future 
conviction as long as that period of time lasted. Under a 
Wallace-inspired rule, the fact that DeLeon’s charges were not yet 
dismissed should not bar his § 1983 action, because to bar the 
action purely based on an anticipated future conviction would be, 
as Justice Scalia puts it, “impractical.” On the other hand, given 
that DeLeon and the courts were aware of the charges hanging 
over his head, his possible future conviction for those charges due 
to some violation of his probation does not seem particularly 
speculative.368 In fact, the Fifth Circuit explicitly recognized that, 
prior to Wallace, an ongoing criminal proceedings rationale to 
support the Heck bar might have worked well as a rule.369 But it 
did not then suggest that the opposite might be true—that, 
post-Wallace, ongoing criminal proceedings would by definition not 
bar a § 1983 suit under Heck. Indeed, such a rule would probably 
push Justice Scalia’s dictum, that “action[s] which would impugn 
 
 367. See supra notes 1–14 and accompanying text (recounting DeLeon’s case). 
 368. The exact terms of DeLeon’s probation are not clear from the case, but in 
general “[n]early a third of the roughly 2.3 million people who exit probation or 
parole annually fail to successfully complete their supervision for a wide range of 
reasons, such as committing new crimes, violating the rules, and absconding.” 
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PROBATION AND PAROLE SYSTEMS MARKED BY HIGH 
STAKES, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/BNG4-M5SS (PDF). 
 369. See supra notes 315–317 and accompanying text (tracing the Fifth 
Circuit’s consideration of Wallace). 
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an anticipated future conviction” do not fall under the Heck bar, 
too far. While convictions under pretrial diversion are not certain, 
they are also not particularly speculative.  
C. Splitting Adjudication from Investigation 
However, at least one additional bright line rule emerges from 
these cases, one which relies on being able to split adjudicative 
proceedings (such as hearings or trials) from investigatory 
procedures (pursuits, arrests, police interviews, and the like). 
Using different terms, the majority opinion in McClish discussed 
these two different kinds of conflicts, either of which might give 
rise to the Heck threshold question.370 One, the kind of suit most 
often barred by Heck, “involved suits seeking damages for allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment.”371 The other 
category described in McClish included cases to recover “for other 
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 
conviction or sentence invalid.”372 The first category involves 
§ 1983 actions that challenge the judgment entered against the 
plaintiff, which in the context of pretrial diversion programs would 
mean challenges to the decision to enter a pretrial diversion 
program at all. These challenges would likely be rare or impossible 
to field, in this context, in part because a participant in the 
program technically enters voluntarily and would have little to 
challenge in the adjudicative process.373 The second category, 
however, in the context of pretrial diversion programs, would 
include challenges to the investigatory procedures that brought 
the alleged offender before the court in the first place. These 
 
 370. See McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Heck 
articulated two different categories of cases where conflicts might arise.”). 
 371. Id.  
 372. Id. 
 373. See, e.g., NAPSA, supra note 48, at 5 (defining pretrial diversion as “any 
voluntary option that provides alternative criminal case processing for a 
defendant charged with a crime”). Of course, “voluntary” is a somewhat relative 
term, given the countless collateral consequences that often accompany 
convictions. See, e.g., National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction, supra note 31, at 1 (providing a database of the numerous collateral 
implications stemming from having a criminal record).  
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challenges would include those brought by Christopher DeLeon, 
whose § 1983 action sought to challenge the validity of his arrest 
and the use of force by the officer who entered his home, as well as 
those of many of the other plaintiffs in the cases described above. 
Tracing the Heck bar along these lines would allow plaintiffs with 
a cognizable § 1983 claim to move forward, while still upholding 
the premises of the Heck doctrine by maintaining the legitimacy of 
the underlying pretrial diversion “conviction.” Indeed, Justice 
Scalia himself recognized the division between the two categories 
in Spencer.374 In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia explained that 
“[i]f, for example, petitioner were to seek damages for using the 
wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result, and if that 
procedural defect did not necessarily imply the invalidity of the 
revocation, then Heck would have no application [at] all.”375 
Identifying challenges to procedural defects as challenges in the 
investigatory process, and challenges to “the wrong result” as 
challenges to the adjudication process, would establish a rule that 
would help lower courts identify exactly where to draw the line 
when faced with a would-be plaintiff who was also a participant in 
a pretrial diversion program. If that individual wanted to 
challenge his or her legal proceedings, including the procedures 
through which he or she entered into pretrial diversion, such a suit 
would be barred under Heck. If, however, an individual wanted to 
challenge the search that led to his arrest, or the circumstances of 
her arrest, those challenges would not be Heck-barred.  
While this approach would still be somewhat labor-intensive, 
requiring courts to delve into the specific facts of each plaintiff’s 
previous participation in the justice system, such a rule would be 
more in line with the primary intent of Heck, which was to prevent 
collateral attacks on otherwise final judgments.376 Equally 
important, it would allow more access to the courts for those 
plaintiffs who, like DeLeon, have a cognizable § 1983 claim, assert 
legitimate complaints against a state actor, and who should not be 
barred from these claims merely because they have entered a 
 
 374. See Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (articulating differences 
between the two categories). 
 375. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 376. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1994) (“This Court has 
long expressed similar concerns for finality and consistency and has generally 
declined to expand opportunities for collateral attack.”). 
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pretrial diversion program under which they have not been 
“convicted” in any real sense.  
Of the three proposals explored above, the proposal suggested 
by the majority opinion in McClish best aligns with both the 
purpose of the § 1983 statute and the policy considerations that 
undergird the Heck line of cases. Section 1983, as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court, primarily acts to protect individuals against 
the abuse of state power.377 In addition, although § 1983 is not 
coequal with the common law, common law principles should be 
used as an aid to interpret it.378 Drawing a line between challenges 
to adjudicative determinations and challenges to investigatory 
proceedings maintains the rights of individuals against the state, 
because they will still be able to challenge acts that have violated 
their constitutional rights. Simultaneously, it does not conflict 
with the rationale offered in Heck, which leverages the similarities 
between § 1983 and the common law tort action for malicious 
prosecution to show that collateral attacks on legitimate 
convictions should not be allowed.379 It would also take care of the 
Sixth Circuit’s concern that allowing collateral challenges for those 
in pretrial diversion would have a chilling effect on prosecutors’ 
willingness to offer pretrial diversion,380 because prosecutors 
would know that the adjudication process—the negotiation and 
acceptance of the pretrial diversion—would not be subject to 
challenge. 
Establishing a bright line between challenges to adjudication 
and challenges to investigatory procedures also answers several, 
although not all, of the policy concerns that arise when pretrial 
diversion participants are barred from bringing § 1983 actions 
purely because of their participation in the program. Does any 
court really think it is fair to pretrial diversion participants to have 
 
 377. Supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text. 
 378. Supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. 
 379. See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text (tracing Justice Scalia’s 
rationale).  
 380. See S.E. v. Grant Cty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(citing the lower court as agreeing “that it would constitute poor public policy to 
permit a criminal defendant to obtain lenient treatment by submitting to a 
benevolent program of this kind and then turn around and sue the arresting 
officer”). 
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their civil rights suits, alleging unconstitutional behavior by a 
person acting “under color of” state law, barred purely because 
they have entered into pretrial diversion? Given the multitude of 
collateral consequences that stem from a criminal conviction, 
concerns about maintaining family and work relationships, and 
the distressing experience of being in prison in general, an 
individual’s choice to accept pretrial diversion should not have to 
be at the expense of their right to pursue justice. The 
adjudicative-investigatory divide helps solve this unenviable 
dilemma. In addition, the rule would ensure equal treatment to 
individuals asserting a federal cause of action despite the fact that 
pretrial diversion programs vary by state.  
Some issues remain. For example, such a rule would preclude 
an individual from challenging a prosecutor’s decision to not offer 
pretrial diversion at all, especially if the individual felt that such 
a decision was being made on racial or other constitutionally 
protected grounds. Given that legislatures manage the 
implementation of state pretrial diversion programs, however, 
they would also be able to appropriately set up mechanisms to 
combat this potential issue.381  
Whatever the approach, a clearer rule of law in this area would 
protect the individual’s right to negotiate freely and to choose his 
or her own path with full knowledge of the potential consequences. 
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent in Spencer, cites a litany of 
cases for the proposition that above all, “[t]he individual’s right to 
the protection of his own good name reflects no more than our basic 
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being— a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”382 As 
it currently stands, an individual entering into a pretrial diversion 
program in many jurisdictions cannot know whether he will lose 
his right to bring a § 1983 action under the Heck bar, because the 
 
 381. See, e.g., DOJ RESEARCH, supra note 27, at 2 (summarizing the 
implementation of statewide diversion programs). But see Shaila Dewan & 
Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
12, 2016, at A1 (“Prosecutors exert almost total control over diversion, deciding 
who deserves mercy and at what price . . . The prosecutors who grant diversion 
often benefit directly from the fees . . . .”). 
 382. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 24 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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courts themselves cannot decide. With such stakes, the image 
presented is hardly one of a “decent system of ordered liberty.”383 
VI. Conclusion 
As pretrial diversion programs proliferate, courts will have to 
assess an increasing number of issues having to do with the 
collateral consequences stemming from these 
programs— including, for example, immigration,384 state and 
federal sentencing,385 juvenile sentencing,386 and even how to 
adapt procedural rules to recognize the possibility of deferred 
adjudication.387 By clarifying the Heck rule in the context of 
pretrial diversion programs, the Supreme Court will give lower 
courts the guidance they need to deal fairly with plaintiffs who 
wish to assert a civil rights action under § 1983. More importantly, 
it will allow people like Christopher DeLeon to enter pretrial 
diversion programs with full awareness of all the potential 
 
 383.  Id.  
 384. See, e.g., SHANE DIZON & NADINE K. WETTSTEIN, Definition and Analysis 
of Convictions for Immigration Purposes, in 3 IMMIGRATION L. SERV. 2d § 13:21 
(2018 Update) (identifying a circuit split in determining whether adjudications 
are final before commencing deportation proceedings). 
 385. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Melgar, 591 F.3d 733, 737 (4th Cir. 
2010) (finding defendant’s participation in a drug treatment program did not 
count as a conviction under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines when it was not 
shown he admitted guilt in open court); United States v. Jones, 448 F.3d 958, 960 
(7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t should be clear that whatever the semantics of the terms 
‘conviction’ and ‘sentence,’ court-ordered dispositions of supervision are properly 
counted in the computation of criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2.”). The 
Guidelines state that, when determining a range, “[d]iversion from the judicial 
process without a finding of guilt (e.g., deferred prosecution) is not counted. A 
diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt . . . is 
counted as a sentence . . . even if a conviction is not formally entered.” U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004) 
(emphasis added). 
 386. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Hochberg, Note, Should Juvenile Adjudications 
Count as Prior Convictions for Apprendi Purposes?, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 
1159 (2004) (evaluating a circuit split that existed as of 2004 in the context of 
sentencing determinations).  
 387. See, e.g., United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 46 
(D.D.C. 2015) (assessing in detail the interaction of deferred prosecution 
agreements with the Speedy Trial Act). 
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collateral consequences. The most effective rule to accomplish 
these goals would be to separate challenges to adjudication from 
challenges to investigatory procedures, maintaining the Heck bar 
for the former but eliminating it for the latter.  
